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Hume's Mature Account of the Indirect Passions^{*}

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Introduction

In his autobiographical *My Own Life*, Hume wrote that Books 1 and 3 of his *Treatise of Human Nature* were “cast anew” in the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding* and the *Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals* respectively. He did not mention Book 2 of his *Treatise* there, nor the *Dissertation on the Passions*. Had he done so, however, he might have said the same thing about this pair. As much is anyway implied in the advertisement to volume 2 of the *Essays and Treatises* (which included the *Dissertation* in between the two *Enquiries* in the fourth and all subsequent editions, mimicking the structure of the *Treatise*): “Most of the principles, and reasonings, contained in this volume, were published in a work in three volumes, called *A Treatise of Human Nature* . . . [The Author] cast the whole anew in the following pieces” (EHU Advertisement; SBN 2).¹

^{*} I am indebted to Helen Steward for comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and to Peter Millican for the same, as well as for countless formative and informative discussions on various aspects of Hume's thought. I am also grateful to Jane McIntyre for her reply to my presentation on this subject at the 2010 Hume Society conference in Antwerp, and to the several participants of the lively discussion that followed, which raised a number of interesting issues and possible lines of objection. I remain convinced that my interpretation is well supported by the texts, but look forward to further debate should such objections be worked out in detail.

¹ In the references to Hume's texts throughout, “EHU” means the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, “EPM” means the *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, “DP” means the *Dissertation on the Passions*, and “T” means the *Treatise of Human Nature*. Arabic numerals refer to section and paragraph numbers (EHU, EPM, and DP), or to Book, part, section, and paragraph numbers (T). SBN numbers refer to pages in the Selby-Bigge and Nidditch editions of the *Treatise* and two *Enquiries*.

The *Dissertation*, it has been suggested, is Hume's most neglected philosophical work.² However that may be, the differences between it and its *Treatise* forerunner seem to have received little attention. The explanation of this is not hard to find. While the two *Enquiries* immediately strike the reader as substantial reworkings of their corresponding *Treatise* books, both containing much that is different and new, the *Dissertation* appears, at first glance, to consist merely of superficially adapted excerpts from Book 2 of the *Treatise*. It is substantially shorter,³ and the order of presentation is changed,⁴ but of the *Dissertation*'s 122 paragraphs only 18 contain anything not found in the earlier work. Of the remaining 104, 74 are almost direct copies (with stylistic changes only), and the other 30 are summaries or paraphrases of familiar material.⁵ Thus Terence Penelhum's comment that "[t]he *Dissertation* is merely a brief résumé of the arguments of Book II of the *Treatise*."⁶

² John Immerwahr (1994, 225).

³ 10,734 words to over 61,300. Even if we discount the two sections on liberty and necessity (which are revisited in the first *Enquiry*), Book 2 of the *Treatise* still weighs in at over 56,600 words, more than five times that of the *Dissertation*. (These figures are taken from the electronic text versions of these works at <http://www.davidhume.org/>. The *Dissertation* text there is from my own edition, and I am confident of its accuracy. The *Treatise* text is still being prepared.)

⁴ Most significantly, the discussion of the direct passions is moved to the beginning of the *Dissertation*, ahead of the indirect passions. See Immerwahr (1994) for a possible explanation of this structural change. Jane McIntyre (2000, §3) hints at another. It is perfectly possible, of course, that Hume had both considerations in mind.

⁵ Cf. the introduction to Tom Beauchamp's critical edition of the *Dissertation* and *Natural History of Religion* (2007, li). A full breakdown of these figures is given in the appendix. Immerwahr gives slightly different statistics: "of the 119 paragraphs of the *Dissertation*, 75 are taken virtually word for word (with minor editorial changes) from the *Treatise*. Another 13 paragraphs are summaries or paraphrases of paragraphs in the *Treatise*. Most of the remaining 31 paragraphs are transitions or more general summaries of material in *Treatise II*" (1994, 227). Presumably much of the numerical disagreement here is superficial, to be explained by our using different criteria for distinguishing our three categories. That I count three more paragraphs in total cannot, of course, be explained in this way. In the Green & Grose edition, paragraphs 2.22 and 2.23 are combined (apparently an error, as they are not combined in any of the editions Hume saw through the press). This might explain one of the missing paragraphs. However, in the electronic edition published by InteLex (to which Immerwahr refers; 227n11), this has been corrected. Beauchamp's edition agrees with my total of 122 paragraphs.

⁶ Penelhum (1975, 110).

If Penelhum were right, there would be nothing of philosophical interest to be found in the *Dissertation* that is not already to be found in the *Treatise*, and commentators would thus justifiably focus their attention on the earlier, longer work. Initial appearances notwithstanding, however, I will argue in what follows that Hume's view of the indirect passions is notably different in the two works, and that the later view avoids a difficulty that beset his earlier account of their causal origins. For clarity—sadly at the expense of some of the mystery—Hume initially thought of the indirect passions (paradigmatically pride, humility, love, and hatred) as simple impressions, but later came to see them as complex perceptions, made up of an impression together with an idea. Whatever other implications there may be, I hope that this discovery will encourage people to look again at a work that has certainly been neglected, and in my opinion undeservedly.

1. The Double Relation of Impressions and Ideas in the *Treatise*

1.1. An Unjustified Conclusion

Crudely, the causal story Hume offers in the *Treatise* concerning the origin of the indirect passions runs as follows: the causes of these passions induce in the mind the idea of their object (self or another) by the association of ideas, and also induce the passion via a separate pleasure or pain and the like association of impressions, and these two kinds of association mutually assist one another in the production of the whole. Thus my beautiful house, for example, prompts the idea of self by the association of ideas, and also induces a separate pleasure on account of its beauty, which pleasurable impression is, in turn, associated with the pleasurable impression of pride. This is the theory of the double relation of impressions and ideas.⁷

⁷ The “principle” of the association of ideas is in fact three analogous principles—*resemblance*, *contiguity*, and *cause and effect*—together responsible, in the first instance, for the succession of ideas in the imagination, by which one idea prompts another, and in the second instance for the compounding of simple ideas into complex ones. The principle of the association of impressions is perhaps less familiar, since Hume only ever puts it to work in his account of the origin of the indirect passions, but the idea is straightforward enough: any passion or secondary impression naturally gives rise to a similar secondary impression; thus “[g]rief and disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again, till the whole circle be completed. In like manner our temper, when elevated with joy, naturally throws itself into love, generosity, pity, courage, pride, and the other resembling affections” (T 2.1.4.3; SBN 283). The principle of the association of impressions really is just one principle, namely resemblance.

In the run up to the presentation of this theory of the double relation, Hume makes a puzzling claim about the relationships between pride and humility, and their common object, self. The passions of pride and humility, he says, *produce* the idea of self:

The first idea, that is presented to the mind, is that of the cause or productive principle. This excites the passion, connected with it; and that passion, when excited, turns our view to another idea, which is that of self. Here then is a passion plac'd betwixt two ideas, of which the one produces it, and the other is produc'd by it. The first idea . . . represents the *cause*, the second the *object* of the passion. (T 2.1.2.4; SBN 278)

There are two distinguishable claims here. To say that a passion produces the idea of self is to say, in the first instance, that the relationship between these two items is that of cause to effect, rather than any other contingent relationship (such as that of effect to cause, or that of effect to part of the cause). But it is also to say, more generally, that the relationship is contingent, rather than logical or conceptual. The first claim entails the second, of course, but not *vice versa*.

The second and more general of these claims has received some attention in twentieth-century commentaries, apparently none of it favourable. Páll Árdal, for example, writes:

Hume thinks of the relation of pride and its object as a contingent relation. One might be proud and yet not think of oneself. . . . But, contrary to Hume's view, one must insist that it would be logically absurd to suggest that a man might have the passion of pride, and, at the same time, that the object of this pride . . . is another and not the person himself. Hume, who in most places appears to think of pride as a form of self-valuing, ought to have seen that 'to think highly of *oneself* because of *y*' and 'to be proud of *y*' are two ways of saying almost the same thing, and that the relation to oneself is a logical aspect of pride without which it could not be pride at all.⁸

⁸ Páll Árdal (1966, 23–24). Cf. Anthony Kenny (1963, 23ff); P. L. Gardiner (1966, 37ff); Penelhum (1975, 99ff).

Setting aside whatever difficulties there may be with this assumption, however, let us just grant Hume the premise that the relationship between pride and its object is contingent (I will return to this issue in §3.3 below). Still, even given this premise, there is the more immediate question of why the relationship should be that of cause to effect in particular, rather than any other contingent relationship.

In arguing for the distinction between the cause of these passions and their object, Hume is of course ruling out the possibility that pride and humility stand to their common object as effects to cause:

[T]ho' that connected succession of perceptions, which we call *self*, be always the object of these two passions, 'tis impossible it can be their CAUSE, or be sufficient alone to excite them. For as these passions are directly contrary, and have the same object in common; were their object also their cause; it cou'd never produce any degree of the one passion, but at the same time it must excite an equal degree of the other; which opposition and contrariety must destroy both. (T 2.1.2.3; SBN 277–78)


But this naturally suggests the possibility that their object is a necessary *part* of their cause, which though insufficient *alone* to excite them, is nevertheless sufficient to this end when joined with the other requisite circumstances.⁹

There is thus an unjustified step in Hume's reasoning here. Assuming that the relationships between pride and humility and the idea of self are contingent, Hume has plausibly argued that the idea of self is not the sole cause of these passions. He has then leapt to the much stronger conclusion that the idea of self is their *effect*, without offering anything in defence of this further claim.

⁹ Penelhum (1975, 99) even goes so far as to say that this suggestion is *clearly implied* by the argument in question, and offers a passage at T 2.1.6.5 (SBN 292) as further support for the claim that Hume endorsed it: "In order to excite pride, there are always two objects we must contemplate, *viz.* the *cause* or that object which produces pleasure; and self, which is the real object of the passions." I suspect that this may be, on balance, too strong an interpretative claim. But no matter: if it is upheld, we must simply acknowledge that Hume was inconsistent on this point (and I take it that this is Penelhum's view). This might then go some way to explaining the error in Hume's reasoning.

1.2. The Redundancy of the Association of Ideas

The situation is yet worse. Not only has Hume helped himself to an unjustified conclusion, but this conclusion renders his theory of the double relation of impressions and ideas unworkable. Consider, for example, my beautiful house, the cause of my pride. The subject of this cause (the house) produces the idea of self by the association of ideas, while the quality of the cause (the beauty) produces a separate pleasure by an original principle (an original principle being a brute, irreducible conjunction, not explainable as an instance of any more general principle or pattern of association; see, for example, T 2.1.3.3 (SBN 280), EHU 1.2 (SBN 6)).¹⁰ This separate pleasure in turn produces the sentiment of pride by the association of impressions. In sum, the causal picture looks something like this:



The grey box on the bottom right represents the cause of pride (divided into the subject and the quality), and the arrows indicate causal efficacy or production.

¹⁰ More or less equivalently, “The *original principles* . . . are the ultimate principles of human nature—the principles beyond which our explanations cannot go.” Miriam McCormick (1993, 107). Cf. Annette Baier (1978), who writes: “Hume distinguishes the natural and original quality that ties pride to self as its object from the natural but non-original (T 281) quality that limits its causes to those related to oneself in the right manner, and his talk of an ‘original’ determination might be taken as a recognition that the tie between pride and its object is special” (29). It is hard to know how to assess this claim, since it is unclear what Baier might mean by “special” here. If she means that the tie is *a priori*, this certainly cannot be right (see §2.2 below, note 16). In any case, it should be clear that the distinction between these two qualities of human nature is merely that the non-original one is thought to be reducible to other, more general principles (the association of impressions, the association of ideas, and the mutual assistance of these two), while the other is not.

The problem with this theory, as the diagram illustrates, is that there is simply no role for the association of ideas to play in the causal generation of the passion. If the passion arises at all, it arises from its association with the pleasure that is caused by (as it might be) the beauty of the house. This passion then produces the idea of self (by an original principle). That the idea of self is associated with the subject of the cause, and produced by that as well (by the association of ideas), is entirely incidental as far of the generation of the passion is concerned, since the idea of self is an *effect* of pride that cannot therefore have anything to do with what *causes* it. In terms of the picture, the arrow joining pride to the idea of self is pointing in the wrong direction.¹¹


Hume cannot simply delete the redundant association of ideas from his theory. For, although it turns out to be redundant on this picture, it certainly cannot be redundant in fact, since pride is underdetermined by the association of impressions alone: why should the pleasure arising from the house's beauty produce pride rather than love? The answer Hume must give is that this is because it is *my* house, rather than someone else's; and so the association of ideas does need to be doing some causal work. As long as the causal efficacy of the original principle uniting the indirect passions with their objects runs in the wrong direction, however, it can't be doing the work that is required. While the tidy pattern between pride, its object, its cause, and the separate pleasure of its cause might look compelling to a careless view, when one actually examines the mechanics of the proposed system, it is seen to be untenable.

1.3. The Redundancy of the Principle of Mutual Assistance

Perhaps what Hume should have said is that the causal relationship between pride and self runs in the other direction: that the idea of self produces the passion—not

¹¹ See also Penelhum (1975, 99). Donald Davidson appears to raise a similar worry (1976, 749), in that he questions what role the association of ideas can be playing in Hume's account. Penelhum and I, however, are concerned about what role this principle can be playing in Hume's account of the causal origin of the indirect passions, because in this regard it seems to be redundant. Davidson, by contrast, is concerned about how it could "strengthen the ties . . . between pride and its object" (ibid.), because its role here is unintelligible. But this never was its intended role, and Davidson's worry seems misplaced.

on its own, of course, but in conjunction with the other requisite circumstances. The picture would then look something like this:



On this alternative account, both associative principles—of impressions and of ideas—are required in the generation of pride. Furthermore, that passion does seem to be fully determined by the combination of the separate pleasure and the idea of self. Replace the pleasure with a pain, and humility instead is produced; replace the idea of self with the idea of another, and love instead is produced; replace both, and hatred is the result.

This second picture, though an improvement on the first in as much as it avoids the redundancy of the association of ideas, still does not square with everything Hume says about his proposal. His causal story is meant to involve the coincidence of *three* general principles (alongside whatever original principles are required to fill in the gaps): the association of impressions, the association of ideas, and the *principle of their mutual assistance*. In introducing this third principle, Hume writes:

IN the *third* place, 'tis observable of these two kinds of association, that they very much assist and forward each other, and that the transition is more easily made where they both concur in the same object. Thus a man, who, by any injury from another, is very much discompos'd and ruffled in his temper, is apt to find a hundred subjects of discontent, impatience, fear, and other uneasy passions; especially if he can discover these subjects in

or near the person, who was the cause [*sic.*] of his first passion. Those principles, which forward the transition of ideas, here concur with those, which operate on the passions; and both uniting in one action, bestow on the mind a double impulse. The new passion, therefore, must arise with so much greater violence, and the transition to it must be render'd so much more easy and natural. (T 2.1.4.4; SBN 283–84)

What does Hume mean by saying that the transition is more easily made when both kinds of association *concur in the same object*? The most obvious explication is that, when an impression and an idea are both present to the mind, and both are associated *with the same object*, then the association of impressions and the association of ideas, “uniting in one action, bestow on the mind a double impulse,” and almost inevitably give rise to that doubly associated object. Not only is this the most obvious explication, I would go so far as to say that it is the only one that makes sense of the way in which the principle of mutual assistance is described.

The difficulty here lies in the fact that the principle, thus understood, manifestly fails to apply to the generation of the indirect passions, because the item at the far end of the association of ideas—whether an effect of the item at the far end of the association of impressions (as on the first picture), or a necessary but insufficient part of its cause (as on the second)—is in any case distinct from that impression. So it is simply not the case that both “kinds of association . . . concur in the same object.” One can see why Hume would have been attracted to this principle of mutual assistance, since it is *prima facie* extremely plausible. One can also see why he might have thought it applied in the case that interested him, given the very close connection between the indirect passions and their objects. But if these are distinct items, however closely connected, then no such mutual assistance principle can apply in the true account of the genesis of the passions.

1.4. Summary

To sum up, Hume describes his theory of the double relation as requiring three general principles: the association of ideas, the like association of impressions, and the mutual assistance of these two. On the most likely reconstruction of the details of this theory (§1.2), it is in fact only the association of impressions that is doing any causal work. On the next most likely reconstruction (§1.3), the association of

ideas also plays a role, but the mutual assistance of the two does not—it cannot, since the two kinds of association do not concur in the same object. We can only conclude that Hume hadn't thought his theory through very clearly.

2. Hume's View of the Indirect Passions in the *Treatise*

2.1. The 'Humean' View of the Indirect Passions

In parts 1 and 2 of Book 2 of the *Treatise*, Hume is primarily concerned with the causal origins of the indirect passions, as discussed above, but he also has a few things to say about their nature. The 'Humean' view of the indirect passions that one can glean from these comments is constituted, I suggest, by the following three claims:

- (1) The indirect passions are simple (that is, indivisible) impressions, and hence cannot be defined (in the sense of being analysed into component parts).
- (2) The indirect passions are essentially feelings or sensations.
- (3) The relationship between an indirect passion and the idea of its object is causal (and thus contingent).

There is little doubt that Hume endorsed all of these claims in the *Treatise*. We have already seen in §1.1 above some of the evidence that he endorsed (3). Further evidence can be found a few pages later:

[N]ature has given to the organs of the human mind, a certain disposition fitted to produce a peculiar impression or emotion, which we call *pride*: To this emotion she has assign'd a certain idea, *viz.* that of *self*, which it never fails to produce. This contrivance of nature is easily conceiv'd. We have many instances of such a situation of affairs. The nerves of the nose and palate are so dispos'd, as in certain circumstances to convey such peculiar sensations to the mind: The sensations of lust and hunger always produce in us the idea of those peculiar objects, which are suitable to each appetite. These two circumstances are united in pride. The organs are so dispos'd as to produce the passion; and the passion, after its production, naturally produces a certain idea. (T 2.1.5.6; SBN 287)

In defence of the attribution of (1), meanwhile, we need only quote Hume's explicit and unambiguous assertions to that effect:

THE passions of PRIDE and HUMILITY being simple and uniform impressions, 'tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions. (T 2.1.2.1; SBN 277)

'TIS altogether impossible to give any definition of the passions of *love* and *hatred*; and that because they produce merely a simple impression, without any mixture or composition. (T 2.2.1.1; SBN 329)

In defence of the attribution of (2), finally, we may also quote an assertion from Book 2:

THE *second* quality, which I discover in these passions, and which I likewise consider as an original quality, is their sensations, or the peculiar emotions they excite in the soul, *and which constitute their very being and essence*. Thus pride is a pleasant sensation, and humility a painful; and upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in reality no pride nor humility. (T 2.1.5.4; SBN 286; my emphasis in the middle)

The text seems to me to leave no room for manoeuvre on any of these points, and indeed it is by no means uncommon to attribute these claims to Hume.¹²

¹² The claims are closely related, and not always distinguished, or distinguished in quite the same way. Allowing for some freedom in this regard: Kenny attributes (3) to Hume, and considers his criticism of this ample grounds for rejecting Hume's view as a whole (1963, 23ff); George Pitcher (1965) offers a sustained attack on (2), beginning with the claim that "Hume certainly held" the view (326); Gardiner has Hume committed to at least (1) and (3) (1966, 37ff), as does Árdal (1966) (Árdal's chapter 1 is titled "The passions as simple impressions"; (3), meanwhile, is subject to criticism in chapter 2, 22ff); Paul Dietl (1968, 557) notes Hume's commitment to (1); Penelhum attributes (1) and (3) to Hume (1975, 91, 99ff); Davidson does likewise (1976, 749); in Annette Baier (1978, 28), (2) and (3) are clearly discernible; Robert Solomon (1980, 42) considers (2) definitional of Hume's view; Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (1982, 167) convicts him of at least (1) and (2), with (3) all but explicit; Penelhum's later article (1993, 125, 128) adds (2) to (1) and (3); John Deigh (1994, 825, 828) has (2) and (3) fundamental to Hume's outlook on the subject, and Eddy Zemach (2001, 197) has these same two definitional of what he terms the "Humean" view; finally, (3) is attributed to Hume by Jane McIntyre (2006, 210), while Lilli Alanen (2006, 188) notes Hume's endorsement of (1).

2.2. Was Hume Really a ‘Humean’ in the *Treatise*?

Though this ‘Humean’ reading of Book 2 of the *Treatise* is dominant, it is not without opponents. At least three commentators have rejected one or more of the relevant interpretative ascriptions: Lili Alanen, Paul Deitl, and Stewart Sutherland.¹³ To start with the most recent, Alanen is anxious to clear Hume of the charge of being an emotivist about the passions, that is, to deny that he held claim (2). In the course of this defence, however, she comes close to denying that Hume held any of the claims (1)–(3).

In response to the passage quoted above, in which Hume asserts that the sensations of the passions “constitute their very being and essence,” Alanen writes:

[I]t is rather peculiar that [Hume] should talk about essences or “the very being” of anything at all, given his general commitment not to pronounce himself on the inner natures or essences of things. Now if we take Hume seriously in this anti-metaphysical commitment, we should not give too much weight to his use of this term. “Essence” here certainly cannot mean necessary *and* sufficient conditions of the passion. All Hume needs and, as I understand it, does, is to emphasize that the affective impression or feeling is a necessary component in the complex of thoughts or ideas constituting a passion, its other necessary constituents being those causing it and those it brings to mind. (187)

If right, this would tell against attributing (2) to Hume. The argument, however, is unconvincing. From the (unsupported) premise that Hume had a general commitment not to pronounce on the essences of things, we are supposed to infer that a passage in which, to all appearances, he is going against that commitment, is to be interpreted in some other way. But such a passage is surely evidence that he had no such general commitment. Nor does this evidence stand alone. Far from it, pronouncements on the essences of things are littered throughout Hume’s texts:

¹³ Alanen (2006), Deitl (1968), Sutherland (1976). Haruko Inoue (2003) should count as a fourth. However, for exegetical reasons that will be made plain when we get there, I will not discuss Inoue’s paper until §3.2 below.

time at T 1.2.2.4 (SBN 31); chance at T 1.3.11.12 (SBN 128); necessity or power at T 1.3.14.16 and 22 (SBN 163, 165), and again in notes to E 8.22 and 25 (SBN 94, 95); belief at T 1.4.2.24 (SBN 199); relation at T 1.4.2.34 (SBN 204); vice and virtue at T 2.1.7.4 and 5 (SBN 296); wit at T 2.1.7.7 (SBN 297); beauty and deformity at T 2.1.8.2 (SBN 299); riches at EPM 6.32 (SBN 247); miracles in a note to EHU 10.12 (SBN 115). As to the evidence on the other side, Alanen does not offer any, but perhaps she has in mind Hume's claim that the essences of the mind and of external bodies are unknown (T Intro; SBN xvii). Such particular denials of knowledge, however, are no proof of any general commitment.¹⁴

On Alanen's alternative understanding of the passage, meanwhile, an indirect passion would seem to be a *complex* perception, comprising the impression that Hume somewhat misleadingly calls the passion, the cause of this impression, and its object. Perhaps, then, Alanen also wishes to deny that Hume held (1), the claim that the indirect passions are simple impressions. But then again perhaps not; for she goes on to acknowledge Hume's endorsement of this claim at the start of the very next section (188). Alanen herself is inconsistent in her use of the term "passion", sometimes using it (as in the passage quoted above) to refer to the complex set of cause, impression, and object, but at other times slipping back into Hume's use of it to refer to the impression alone: "The *cause* is the idea which excites the passion, the *object* is that to which, once excited, 'they direct their view'" (188). Using a word ambiguously is in itself no crime, of course, but in the present context it is suggestive of a deeper underlying lack of clarity.

This unclarity comes to the fore when Alanen is considering Hume's attitude to claim (3), that the relationship between an indirect passion and its object is contingent:

¹⁴ Alanen's talk of "inner natures" alongside "essences," and her description of the supposed commitment as an "anti-metaphysical" one, suggest a metaphysically loaded reading of "essence" in the passage in question. But no such reading is necessary: when making claims about the essences of things, all Hume is doing, as I understand it, is pointing out their defining characteristics.

That the passions [1] are causally related to their antecedent ideas as well as to those that unfailingly succeed them, and that Hume's concept of causality is ultimately contingent, tend to obscure the fact that there are systematic relationships between the ideas that are constitutive of the passions [2] but that cannot be explained through mere accidental brute associations. (185)

Notice first that the passions [1] have distinct causes and objects, while the passions [2] are *constituted*, in part, by these causes and objects; here, then, we have Alanen using the term equivocally in the very same sentence. And notice, second, that Alanen concedes that the impression which Hume calls the passion is contingently related to its cause and its object. Thus she accepts that Hume endorsed claim (3).

Her point, then, is that Hume's commitment to (3) tends to obscure the fact that, for him, there are also systematic *non-causal* relationships between a passion, its cause, and its object. There need be no contradiction here: perhaps the same things can be related both causally and non-causally.¹⁵ But what exactly *are* the supposed non-causal relationships? Hume nowhere mentions them, nor does Alanen explicate them any further. There are certainly non-causal relationships between the passions *understood as complex wholes* and the causes and objects which are two of their (logically) necessary constituents. But this is the result merely of introducing some new terminology. One could generate logical connections between *anything* and the "passions" in this way, simply by defining that term appropriately, and nothing to upset the mainstream interpretation of Book 2 has been offered. My best diagnosis of what is going on here is therefore that Alanen has been misled by her own ambiguity into thinking that she has established a more interesting and substantial claim than she in fact has.

¹⁵ This seems especially plausible for mental things. It might be thought, for example, that one belief can both cause and entail another. Cf. Davidson (1976), who has it that Hume's cause of pride also logically entails "the judgement that is identical with pride" (751). I need hardly add that at this stage in Davidson's dialectic we have left Hume far behind. Hume's passions are not truth-apt, and thus not logically entailed by anything (see T 2.3.3.5, 3.1.1.9; SBN 415, 458). There is no hint, meanwhile, that entailment is the sort of logical relationship that Alanen has in mind; she talks rather of one thing being a necessary constituent of another.

Going back a little further, Deitl and Sutherland both argue, in a similar vein, that Hume did not endorse claim (3). Neither author addresses the textual evidence I have given above in favour of the mainstream interpretation, and in the absence of any response to this evidence—which strikes me as about as unambiguous as textual evidence can be—their positive arguments would need to carry considerable weight to hold sway. Sutherland, however, relies primarily on a parallel with moral praise and blame, arguing that if the mainstream interpretation of the indirect passions is carried over to moral judgement, then the picture of the latter is highly implausible. The proper conclusion to draw from this is that, in so far as the parallel holds, Hume’s account of moral judgement is in those respects implausible. Of course, other things being equal, one favours more charitable over less charitable interpretations of any of the great dead colleagues, Hume included. But other things in this case are not equal: the more charitable interpretation just doesn’t seem to square with the text, and Sutherland offers nothing to combat this strong appearance.

Deitl does offer some direct textual evidence from Book 2 of the *Treatise*, but on inspection it is defeasible. He calls attention to the “Experiments to confirm this system” (the system in question being the theory of the double relation of impressions and ideas) in part 2, section 2, and in particular to the references there to *a priori* reasoning. These references, he writes, “are as unmistakable as they are surprising” (559). He continues:

We all know that for Hume the province of reason is restricted to the ‘world of ideas’ (I, iii, 3), and he considers it a matter of considerable importance that reason alone cannot establish the necessity of a cause and effect relation (I, iii, 6). Yet the experiments are clearly said to provide reason with a basis for drawing conclusions *a priori*, conclusions not about relations among ideas but about relations between passions and the circumstances which attend or, as Hume puts it equally often, *cause* the passion.

He then goes on to conclude that Hume was engaged, throughout his discussion, in conceptual analysis rather than causal psychology (saying nothing about the peculiarity, on this interpretation, of Hume’s causal terminology).

In fact, however, of the eight experiments Hume gives in this section, not one of them is described as providing reason with a basis for drawing conclusions *a priori*. Rather, in two of the eight, Hume ventures a so-called “*a priori*” argument *before* the experiment itself then shows us that “[t]his reasoning *a priori* is confirm’d by experience” (T 2.2.2.6; SBN 334). More importantly, these two arguments are in any case not *a priori* in the strict sense, and it is clear from the context that Hume himself does not mean them to be (after all, no strictly *a priori* argument would be in need of confirmation by experience). All he means by describing them as such is that they are prior *to the particular experiment in question*. (See also T 3.2.12.4 (SBN 571) and EPM 5.43 (SBN 230), where Hume likewise ventures “*a priori*” arguments that are clearly not *a priori* in the strict sense.)¹⁶

The textual evidence in support of the mainstream interpretation is clear and unambiguous. The attempts to steer Hume away from any commitment to the three claims in question, meanwhile, are unsuccessful. It seems safe to conclude, therefore, that in Book 2 of the *Treatise* Hume really was committed to the simplicity and indefinability of the indirect passions, their essentially sensational nature, and the contingency of their connection to their objects.

3. The Nature and Origin of the Indirect Passions in the *Dissertation*

3.1. Hume’s Anti-Humeanism in the Dissertation

Given the dominance of these three claims in the commentaries on Hume’s view of the indirect passions, and the prevailing supposition that the *Dissertation on the Passions* is just a précis of *Treatise* Book 2, it may come as a surprise to learn that

¹⁶ Baier similarly maintains that Hume “claims to know, a priori, that ‘these passions are determin’d to have self for their object’ (T 280) and says that this determination is not only by a ‘natural’ but by an ‘original’ property” (1978, 28). In the passage referred to, however, Hume doesn’t claim to know anything *a priori*, and so it is unclear what is meant to be supporting this controversial claim. On the meaning of an “original” property, meanwhile, see §1.2 above, esp. note 10.

Hume in fact abandoned all three theses in the later work—or it might have done, had you not already read my introduction. Surprising or not, this is the conclusion I aim to establish in the present section.

The first thing to note is that none of the passages in the *Treatise* committing Hume to the simplicity of the passions, their essentially sensational nature, or the causal nature of the connection between a passion and its object is carried over to the *Dissertation*. Of course one cannot conclude from this alone that Hume abandoned any of these doctrines. However, these deletions are joined with decisive positive evidence that the theses were abandoned outright. Recall the *Treatise* passages, already quoted above, committing Hume to the simplicity of the passions:

THE passions of PRIDE and HUMILITY being simple and uniform impressions, 'tis impossible we can ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions. (T 2.1.2.1; SBN 277)

'TIS altogether impossible to give any definition of the passions of *love* and *hatred*; and that because they produce merely a simple impression, without any mixture or composition. (T 2.2.1.1; SBN 329)

And now compare the corresponding passages in the *Dissertation*:

Pride is a certain satisfaction in ourselves, on account of some accomplishment or possession, which we enjoy: *Humility*, on the other hand, is a dissatisfaction with ourselves, on account of some defect or infirmity.

Love or *Friendship* is a complacency in another, on account of his accomplishments or services: *Hatred*, the contrary. (DP 2.1–2)

The most natural way to read these passages is as offering straightforward definitions of the passions in question. On this reading, they indicate a (tacit) switch to the view that these passions are *complex* perceptions, made up out of an impression—satisfaction, dissatisfaction, complacency, or its contrary—together

with an idea—self or another.¹⁷ In particular, pride is a certain *satisfaction in ourselves*, making the relationship between pride and self, on Hume’s mature view, conceptual and hence non-causal; thus theses (1) and (3) have been rejected.

Is this too hasty a conclusion to draw on the basis merely of two sentences? Would Hume not have heralded so radical a departure from his earlier views more clearly? There is no reason to think so: Hume was not generally in the habit of acknowledging the changes in his thinking explicitly in print (the only exception being the appendix to the *Treatise*, where he attempts some corrections to Book 1), although he was silently revising and amending new editions of his works throughout his life. Anyone wishing to read these sentences in an unnatural way—for example in line with Hume’s former view of the indirect passions as simple impressions—must offer evidence internal to the *Dissertation* in support of such a reading (it plainly will not do to argue that this must still be Hume’s view because it once was). I can find no such evidence.

When Hume thinks that something cannot be defined in terms of its component parts, because it is simple, he is typically very explicit on the point, offering instead a “description”, or pointing out the circumstances in which the impression occurs (EHU 5.12 (SBN 48–49) on the sentiment of belief, for example; EHU 7 (especially 7.4; SBN 62) on the impression of necessary connexion; and of course T 2.1.2.1 and 2.2.1.1 (SBN 277, 329) on the earlier view of the indirect passions themselves). If he makes no such claim about the indirect passions in the *Dissertation*, venturing instead what naturally look like definitions in terms of component parts, then we must conclude that he came to view these as complex perceptions.

Hume also says enough in the *Dissertation* to assure the attentive reader that he has abandoned thesis (2) concerning the essentially sensational nature of the passions. In the case of pride, it is the sensation of satisfaction *together with the awareness of self* that is now said to be essential:


¹⁷ It should be noted that Hume nowhere explicitly acknowledges the existence or even the possibility of a complex perception that is part impression and part idea, a fact which may be thought to tell against my interpretation. I pursue this issue in §3.3 below.

With regard to all these passions, the causes are what excite the emotion; the object is what the mind directs its view to when the emotion is excited. Our merit, for instance, raises pride; and *it is essential to pride to turn our view on ourselves with complacency and satisfaction.* (DP 2.4; my emphasis)

This, of course, is what Hume must now say, given his definition of pride as a certain kind of self-satisfaction; thus it is further confirmation of this complex view of the indirect passions to find an explicit rejection of the previously endorsed thesis (2).

3.2. *The Theory of the Double Relation in the Dissertation*

I suggest that what motivated Hume to adopt a view of the indirect passions as complex perceptions was precisely his theory of their causal origins, the double relation of impressions and ideas. For it is only on this conception of the passions that both kinds of association *and the principle of their mutual assistance* can be doing the work that Hume's theory requires. With pride as a complex perception, the causal picture now looks something like this:



Not only are both associative principles necessary in the generation of pride, but both now concur in the same object (on the most obvious understanding of that phrase, that is, they associate the cause and its separate pleasure with one and the same item). Thus we are able to make sense, and in an entirely straightforward way, of the principle of their mutual assistance that was so puzzling in the *Treatise* presentation. Everything that Hume had tried to say about his theory in that earlier

work, but which on close examination failed to fit the picture, is easily seen to apply to this later view.¹⁸

Haruko Inoue offers an unorthodox interpretation of Hume’s account of the indirect passions in the *Treatise* that comes very close to the present proposal concerning the *Dissertation*.¹⁹ According to this reading,

the indirect passions stand in such complex relations to other ideas and impressions as to make them very much like complex impressions in themselves. Passions or “impressions of reflexion” may certainly be “simple and uniform impressions” (T 2.1.2.1; SBN 277), as Hume assures us, but they are nevertheless virtually “complex” or rather ‘hybrid’ in their nature, as they consist in these two “original qualities” which are “correspondent to the suppos’d properties of their causes” (T 2.1.5.3; SBN 286): “the peculiar direction of the thought” (*ibid.*) to the self or to the other self, and “the peculiar [pleasurable or painful] emotions they excite in the soul . . . which constitute their very being and essence” (T 2.1.5.4; SBN 286). (213)

The view seems to be slightly misdescribed. The indirect passions do not stand in any complex relations to other *impressions* on this account: one of their two “original qualities” is simply that they *are* a peculiar pleasurable or painful impression. But they do stand in a curious relationship to another idea, namely the idea of their object. Beyond this, it is not clear to me what exactly Inoue’s proposal is—just what is a “virtually complex” or “hybrid” impression that is

¹⁸ It is worth pointing out here that an error in the *Treatise* passage in which Hume introduces the mutual assistance principle—the *object* of the angered man’s passion is described as its *cause*—is corrected when this passage reappears in the *Dissertation* (from its very first edition); T 2.1.4.4 (SBN 283–84) / DP 2.8. This is a small point, certainly, but incontrovertible proof that Hume was correcting his earlier work at least in some respects, and not merely *précising*. More interestingly, the inclusion of direct passions in the illustrative example here (fear, impatience) suggests the possibility that these, too, should count as complex perceptions on Hume’s mature account. In one place in the *Dissertation*, however, joy and sorrow are described as impressions (DP 1.9), suggesting instead that Hume may have continued to view them as simple. There is more to be said about this tension, and about the direct passions in general. It lies, however, beyond the scope of the present essay.

¹⁹ Inoue (2003).

nonetheless simple and uniform? Nevertheless, it seems that what Inoue wants to be able to say here is that the pleasurable or painful impression and the object-directedness are both somehow intrinsic qualities of the passions. And this is precisely what the present interpretation of the *Dissertation* gives us: the passions are complex perceptions consisting of an impression coupled with an idea.

I am unable to discern any argument in Inoue's paper for this interpretation of Hume's view in the *Treatise*. The two paragraphs she (selectively) quotes from, however, do seem to me to be those in which Hume comes closest to his later account. (This is why I postponed discussion of Inoue's paper in §2.2 above, note 13.) Here are the relevant passages in full:

First, I find, that the peculiar object of pride and humility is determin'd by an original and natural instinct, and that 'tis absolutely impossible, from the primary constitution of the mind, that these passions shou'd ever look beyond self, or that individual person, of whose actions and sentiments each of us is intimately conscious. Here at last the view always rests, when we are actuated by either of these passions; nor can we, in that situation of mind, ever lose sight of this object. For this I pretend not to give any reason; but consider such a peculiar direction of the thought as an original quality.

THE *second* quality, which I discover in these passions, and which I likewise consider as an original quality, is their sensations, or the peculiar emotions they excite in the soul, and which constitute their very being and essence. Thus pride is a pleasant sensation, and humility a painful; and upon the removal of the pleasure and pain, there is in reality no pride nor humility. (T 2.1.5.3–4; SBN 286)

That pride and humility always give rise to the idea of self is said, first, to be an original instinct or quality of the mind. In the next paragraph Hume goes on to say that the sensations excited by the passions are a second "original quality"—not of the mind now, but of the passions themselves. The wording suggests a parallel between these two supposed "original qualities". but it is a false parallel: the first quality is an original principle of human nature that unites two distinct things, a passion and its object, while the second quality is simply what the passions essentially are, and not, in truth, an original quality of anything at all (or at least not in the same sense).

Hume is not entitled to treat these two things in the same way, therefore, although this passage does suggest that he wanted to be able to (and indeed, his appeal to the principle of mutual assistance *requires* that he be able to). Here, then, Hume was perhaps vaguely grasping at the view that he subsequently hit on more clearly. If we want to find something like Inoue's picture in Hume, however, I suggest that we will be hard pressed to find it in the *Treatise*—and we certainly won't find it there in isolation from other claims that contradict it. The more carefully worked out *Dissertation* is the better place to look.

3.3. Atomism and Complex Passions: a Tension in Hume's Thought

If pride is a complex perception consisting of an impression of satisfaction together with the idea of self, then the relationship between pride and self is conceptual rather than contingent. Hume's mature account of the indirect passions, therefore, is immune from the common twentieth-century criticism of his earlier account with which we began our discussion (§1.1, note 8). We cannot be quite so quick to acquit Hume of all possible charges here, however. For although the relationship between *pride* and self is now conceptual, a question still remains about the relationship between the particular *satisfaction* in question and self. If this latter relationship turns out to be contingent, just as the relationship between pride and self was on Hume's earlier account, then the only real advance made in the *Dissertation* will be terminological: the impression formerly labelled "pride" is now labelled "satisfaction", with "pride" being reserved for the combination of this impression with the idea of self. Simply *giving a name* in this way to a combination of two perceptions, however, obviously doesn't establish any conceptual relationship between them (recall my response to Alanen's interpretation of the *Treatise*, §2.2), and a very similar criticism will still apply at this lower level.

In the *Dissertation*, Hume never explicitly discusses the relationship between the idea of self and the satisfaction in question. To establish what he thought about it, we must garner evidence from other quarters. Ultimately, it seems to me that the best we can say is that there is a tension in Hume's thinking on this matter. On the one hand, his account of the causal genesis of the indirect passions requires their impression components to be more than contingently related to their objects (their idea components). For if these two components are simply coincident effects of a

common cause (the satisfaction, for example, arising solely out of its association with the pleasure caused by surveying or contemplating my beautiful house, the idea of self arising solely out of its association with my beautiful house directly), then there is no sense in which the two kinds of association can be mutually assisting one another. These two principles really must concur *in the same object*, and not just be associating distinct items that are connected merely in name. On the other hand, however, Hume's mental atomism seems to leave no room for the existence of such a *unified* or *indivisible* impression-idea perception. If pride is a complex perception, then it can be broken down into its component parts, with each part a complete perception in its own right, and one that could (conceptually, at least, if not in fact) occur on its own. Put simply, Hume's account of the causal origins of pride requires that emotion to be a unified perception of satisfaction *in oneself*, whereas all his mental atomism allows is a complex combination of satisfaction *and oneself*.

On the face of it, the fact that Hume never explicitly acknowledges the existence of complex perceptions that are part impression and part idea may be thought to tell against the present interpretation of the *Dissertation* (recall §3.1, note 17). If he had come to believe that there were such things, after all, one might reasonably have expected him to mention them somewhere—perhaps in section 2 of the first *Enquiry*, which contains his mature presentation of the distinction between impressions and ideas (if not from its first edition, then at least in a subsequent revision of that work after publication of the *Dissertation*). In fact, however, I believe that the absence of any explicit statement to this effect provides, if anything, further confirmation of my view. For if Hume had explicitly acknowledged the existence of such things, and explicitly named the indirect passions as examples, then we would be under much more pressure to view their component parts, in line with Hume's official picture of the mind and its contents, as merely contingently related. The advance on Book 2 of the *Treatise* would then be purely terminological. My suggestion is that the *Dissertation* hints at a substantially different account of the nature of the indirect passions, one on which the impression component and the idea component are more than contingently related, but one that for this very reason doesn't fit with Hume's atomistic conception of the mind. Certainly Hume never addressed this tension in print, and

was probably never even fully aware of it. But if we assume that he had at least a faint grasp of the problem, it is after all no wonder that he should have remained silent on precisely the point where the difficulty shows up most clearly.²⁰

Conclusion

Hume's *Treatise* account of the origin of the indirect passions was confused and in tension with his then account of the passions themselves (§§1–2). He must have realised this after publication, however, because he fixed these problems in the *Dissertation* by adopting a complex view of the indirect passions (§3.1). Having noticed the tension between his accounts of the nature of the indirect passions and of their causal origin, I surmise, he kept the latter and modified the former to fit (§3.2). It may also be to his credit that this internal correction dodges what has been one of the most common external objections to his (earlier) view among recent commentators—that it renders the connection between a passion and its object contingent instead of conceptual (§1.1, §3.3). Critics of this aspect of Hume's view, therefore, have unfairly ignored his final word on the subject, while those commentators who have attempted to acquit Hume of the charge with reference to the *Treatise* alone (Alanen, Deitl, Inoue, Sutherland; §2.2, §3.2) have missed a valuable—indeed, the best—source of evidence for their case.

²⁰ A deeper treatment of this tension seems to be called for, and one that is sensitive to the development of other aspects of Hume's philosophy over time. As noted by Peter Millican (2002, 50–1n37), Hume's "Separability Principle" is conspicuously absent from the first *Enquiry*, a fact which at least allows us to speculate that his commitment to atomism weakened over time. The available evidence seems hard to assess, but such a speculation certainly sits easily with the present interpretation of the *Dissertation*. Also worthwhile would be a comparison of the *Dissertation*'s account of the indirect passions with Hume's mature account of belief. In the first *Enquiry*, belief is said to be a "sentiment or feeling . . . annexed to" an idea (EHU 5.11; SBN 48). One possible reading of this passage (I do not say the only one) has beliefs as complex perceptions, part impression and part idea, just like the indirect passions ("sentiment" is frequently used by Hume in referring to impressions; see, for example, EHU 2.1, 2.5–6 (SBN 17, 19); DP 2.12–13, 2.22, 3.1, 3.9, 4.1–3, 4.12–13). Taken in a way that is compatible with the atomism, this interpretation would no doubt make for a very unsatisfactory account. But if the atomism is already in question, perhaps it could start to look like a possibility worth pursuing. For an interesting discussion of the first *Enquiry* on belief, see Justin Broackes (2002).

Appendix: Comparison of the *Dissertation* and *Treatise* Book 2

The following table explains the division of the 122 paragraphs of the *Dissertation* given in the introduction above into new (18), copies (74), and summaries (30). “Copies” are sometimes shorter than their originals, and often contain a handful of stylistic changes. A “cf.” entry means material or wording too different to count as a copy, but containing no new ideas. Typically these are summaries or paraphrases of *Treatise* material. Deciding which of these two categories a paragraph should belong to was not always straightforward. For example, DP 3.6 is a direct copy of T 2.2.6.3 except for the last two sentences; but since these novel sentences are summary in nature, the whole paragraph has been counted as a summary. In producing the table, all paragraphs of the *Dissertation* were assumed new until proven otherwise; if anyone notices a “new” paragraph that does, after all, have a precursor in the *Treatise*, I would gladly be corrected.

The table was drawn up independently of Tom Beauchamp’s computer collation of the *Dissertation* with *Treatise* Book 2 (the results of which are given in the introduction to his critical edition of the *Dissertation* and *Natural History of Religion*, l–cxvi). It is perhaps confirmation of both comparisons, therefore, that we largely agree about which *Treatise* passages correspond to which *Dissertation* paragraphs. There is, however, one point of disagreement: Beauchamp locates the origin of DP 2.41 at T 2.1.6.3, because of a few words that these paragraphs have in common; whereas I have its origin three paragraphs later, at T 2.1.6.6—not because of common words, but because Hume is here making the same point in different words. DP 2.41 repeats what was, in the *Treatise*, the *third* limitation of Hume’s system, and not, as Beauchamp’s comparison has it, the first.

<i>Dissertation</i>		<i>Treatise</i>	
section	paragraph	section	paragraph
SECT. 1		≈ 2.3.9	
§1	1	-	<i>new</i>
	2		<i>new</i>
§2	3	2.3.9	<i>new</i>
	4		<i>copy of 2.3.9.5</i>
	5		<i>copy of 2.3.9.6</i>
	6		<i>copy of 2.3.9.7</i>
§3	7	2.3.9	<i>copy of 2.3.9.9</i>
	8		<i>copy of 2.3.9.10</i>
	9		<i>copy of 2.3.9.11</i>
	10		<i>copy of 2.3.9.12</i>
§4	11	2.3.9	<i>copy of 2.3.9.18</i>
	12		<i>copy of 2.3.9.19</i>
§5	13	2.3.9	<i>copy of 2.3.9.20</i>
§6	14	2.3.9	<i>copy of 2.3.9.21</i>
	15		<i>copy of 2.3.9.22</i>
	16		<i>copy of 2.3.9.23</i>
	17		<i>copy of 2.3.9.24</i>
§7	18	2.3.9	<i>copy of 2.3.9.25</i>
§8	19	2.3.9	<i>copy of 2.3.9.27–28</i>
	20		<i>copy of 2.3.9.29</i>
§9	21	2.3.9	<i>copy of 2.3.9.14</i>
	22		<i>copy of 2.3.9.15</i>
	23		<i>copy of 2.3.9.16</i>
	24		<i>copy of 2.3.9.17</i>
	25		<i>new</i>
SECT. 2		≈ 2.1	
§1	1	-	<i>new</i>
	2		<i>new</i>
§2	3	2.1.2, 2.2.1	cf. 2.1.2 & 2.2.1
	4		<i>new</i> ; but cf. 2.1.2 & 2.2.1
	5		cf. 2.1.2 & 2.2.1
§3	6	2.1.4	<i>copy of 2.1.4.2</i>
	7		<i>copy of 2.1.4.3</i>
	8		<i>copy of 2.1.4.4</i>
	9		<i>copy of 2.1.4.5</i>
§4	10	2.1.5	cf. 2.1.5
	11		cf. 2.1.5
§5	12	2.1.5	cf. 2.1.5, 2.1.7.1
	13		cf. 2.1.5, 2.1.7.1
§6	14	2.1.7	<i>copy of 2.1.7.2+5</i>
	15		<i>copy of 2.1.7.6</i>
	16		<i>copy of 2.1.7.7</i>

§7	17 18 19 20	2.1.8	<i>copy of 2.1.8.1</i> cf. 2.1.8.2–3 <i>copy of 2.1.8.5</i> <i>copy of 2.1.8.6</i>
§8	21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29	2.1.9	<i>copy of 2.1.9.1</i> <i>copy of 2.1.9.6</i> <i>copy of 2.1.9.7</i> <i>copy of 2.1.9.8</i> <i>copy of 2.1.9.9</i> <i>copy of 2.1.9.10</i> <i>copy of 2.1.9.11</i> <i>copy of 2.1.9.12</i> <i>copy of 2.1.9.13</i>
§9	30 31 32	2.1.10	cf. 2.1.10.1 <i>copy of 2.1.10.2</i> cf. 2.1.10.3
§10	33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40	2.1.11	<i>new</i> <i>new</i> <i>copy of 2.1.11.11</i> <i>copy of 2.1.11.12</i> <i>new</i> <i>new</i> <i>copy of 2.1.11.13</i> <i>new</i>
§11	41 42 43 44 45 46 47	2.1.6, 2.1.8	<i>copy of 2.1.6.6</i> <i>copy of 2.1.6.7</i> <i>copy of 2.1.6.4</i> <i>copy of 2.1.8.8</i> <i>copy of 2.1.8.9</i> <i>copy of 2.1.6.8</i> <i>copy of 2.1.6.9</i>
SECT. 3		≈ 2.2	
§1	1 2	2.1.1, 2.1.2	cf. 2.1.1–2 cf. 2.1.1–2
§2	3 4 5	2.2.4	cf. 2.2.4.2 cf. 2.2.4.2 cf. 2.2.4.3
§3	6	2.2.6	cf. 2.2.6 esp. 2.2.6.3
§4	7 8	2.2.7, 2.2.8	cf. 2.2.7 cf. 2.2.8
§5	9 10	2.2.9	cf. 2.2.9 cf. 2.2.9
§6	11 12	-	<i>new</i> <i>new</i>
§7	13 14	2.2.10, 2.2.11	cf. 2.2.10 cf. 2.2.11

SECT. 4		≈ 2.2.2, 2.2.8	
§1	1	-	<i>new</i>
§2	2 3	2.2.2	cf. 2.2.2.11–13 cf. 2.2.2.11–13
§3	4	2.2.2	cf. 2.2.2.14–16
§4	5	2.2.2	cf. 2.2.2.18
§5	6 7 8 9	2.2.8	<i>copy of 2.2.8.13</i> <i>copy of 2.2.8.15</i> <i>copy of 2.2.8.16</i> <i>copy of 2.2.8.17</i>
§6	10 11	2.2.8	<i>copy of 2.2.8.18</i> <i>copy of 2.2.8.19</i>
§7	12 13	-	<i>new</i> ; cf. 2.3.6.1 (notice the contrast) <i>copy of 2.2.2.8</i>
SECT. 5		≈ 2.3.3	
§1	1	2.3.3	cf. 2.3.3.1–9
§2	2	2.3.3	cf. 2.3.3.1–9
§3	3	2.3.3	cf. 2.3.3.1–9
§4	4	2.3.3	<i>copy of 2.3.3.10</i>
SECT. 6		≈ 2.3.4–8	
§1	1 2 3 4	2.3.4	cf. 2.3.4.1 <i>copy of 2.3.4.2</i> <i>copy of 2.3.4.3</i> <i>new</i>
§2	5	2.3.4	<i>copy of 2.3.4.4</i>
§3	6		<i>copy of 2.3.4.5</i>
§4	7	2.3.4	<i>copy of 2.3.4.6</i>
§5	8 9	2.3.4	<i>copy of 2.3.4.7</i> <i>copy of 2.3.4.8</i>
§6	10	2.3.4	<i>copy of 2.3.4.9</i>
§7	11	2.3.4	<i>copy of 2.3.4.10</i>
§8	12	2.3.5	<i>copy of 2.3.5.2</i>
§9	13 14 15 16 17 18	2.3.6–8	<i>copy of 2.3.6.1</i> <i>copy of 2.3.6.5</i> <i>copy of 2.3.6.6</i> <i>copy of 2.3.6.7–8</i> <i>copy of 2.3.6.9</i> cf. 2.3.7–8
afterword		-	
	1	-	<i>new</i>

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