Skepticism about Garrett’s *Hume*: Faculties, Concepts, and Imposed Coherence

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*Hume*, Don Garrett’s new book—long anticipated and well worth the wait—is a tour de force. Garrett’s impressive ability to weave a coherent philosophical account of Hume’s ideas, even when they seem most muddled or contradictory, is here fully displayed, linking together Hume’s thought as a whole and finding systematic themes within it whose potential richness has escaped other commentators. As a great admirer of Garrett’s work, from which I have learned so much over the years, I found it fascinating to see how his overall interpretation of Hume pulls together a variety of strands that are by now very familiar to me, but whose potential close interconnections I had not fully appreciated. Although the book aims to be “accessible to readers who have no specialized training in philosophy and little prior knowledge of Hume”—and mostly achieves this—it will undoubtedly prove to be, as Garrett hopes, “of substantial interest to historians of philosophy and to other philosophers grappling with questions like those that animated Hume” (*Hume*, xix). Indeed I would judge it to be one of those relatively few secondary works that ought to be read by all serious scholars of Hume, given the sweep of its discussions and insights and the way in which it can help us understand familiar passages in new ways, not least by highlighting some of those general themes and connections that Garrett sees as unifying Hume’s philosophy. Even scholars who disagree with these unifying analyses will learn a great deal through critical engagement with Garrett’s thought-provoking and often ingenious arguments.

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1. Teaching and Tone

Garrett’s book will also provide a valuable resource for teaching, providing coverage of all the main areas of Hume’s philosophy (including aesthetics, morals, and religion) and nicely framing the principal discussions between a first chapter that presents an excellent potted history of Hume’s life and works and an interesting final chapter that discusses Hume’s legacy. In the main body of the book, however, Garrett’s enthusiastic commitment to his distinctive and highly systematic understanding of Hume’s philosophy as a whole—which makes his work so interesting and challenging for other scholars—also brings some corresponding drawbacks for its use as a teaching resource. For in the process of presenting this vision, Garrett makes many general claims about Hume’s usage of terms and how his philosophy is to be understood, but most of these are not backed up in detail here, so they must be taken on trust. Garrett’s general avoidance of detailed scholarly debate is deliberate (see Hume, xx), and for many students this approach might indeed be very suitable, giving them one clear, overall picture of Hume’s thought, without having to worry too much about either scholarly disagreements or inconvenient exceptions, changes of mind, ambiguities, and apparent confusions in Hume’s own texts. But for those who need to get seriously engaged in the scholarly literature and grapple with interpretative debates, it is a shame to see so little distinction drawn between claims that are uncontroversial or very widely accepted and those that are Garrett’s own. He knows the texts very well and weaves a plausible narrative, so most of his controversial claims are hard to assess in a brief discussion. But some prove to be straightforwardly false. For example, Garrett claims that “[Hume] employs the term ‘justified’ only for persons, never for beliefs, and he applies the term ‘just’ only to reasonings and the drawing of conclusions” (Hume, 170). This claim—from which Garrett draws further interpretative conclusions—can easily be tested using electronic resources such as Hume Texts at www.davidhume.org, where a search for “justified” pulls up eight paragraphs, of which the first, in Letter to a Gentleman, applies it to a proposition (31), the fourth to a “verdict” (“Standard of Taste,” 235), the fifth to an assertion (“Original Contract,” 471), the sixth to disputes (“Coalition of Parties,” 494), the seventh to actions (EPM 1.5; SBN 171),1 and the eighth to a comparison (DNR 12.5).2 So Garrett’s claim is straightforwardly correct in only two of the eight cases. As for his claim about “just,” this occurs 207 times, and again counterexamples can quickly be found. A different sort of case occurs when we are told that “Hume consistently followed his rule of never replying to attacks on his writings” (Hume, 30), but the Letter from a Gentleman and some other letters—for example, to Hugh Blair in 1761 (Hume to Blair, 1761, in Letters 1:349–51), responding to Campbell’s Dissertation on Miracles—provide counterexamples to this claim.3
Of course we all make mistakes, and my concern here is not with the presence of errors, which are inevitable, but rather with “the positive Air, which prevails in that Book” (Hume to John Stewart, February 1754, in *Letters* 1:187), and which risks misleading the reader about the level of interpretation that is going into Garrett’s assertions. I am not suggesting that Garrett himself is a dogmatist or aiming to suppress debate; indeed, he takes the trouble to conclude his chapters with very useful references to contrary interpretations, and his own view has clearly developed in various respects since his earlier book of 1997, as he acknowledges in respect of Hume’s argument concerning induction (*Hume*, 210). The worry is rather that a book aimed at preparing students to engage in scholarly discussion needs to be particularly careful in distinguishing between agreed facts and original interpretative claims, since otherwise the students are likely to confuse these, which hampers their ability to assess—and contribute effectively to—the relevant debates. This concern is especially pertinent when the book is so interpretatively rich, aspiring to present a systematic Humean philosophy rather than a straightforward and relatively unadorned picture of Hume’s published views.

### 2. Boundaries, Abstraction, and Negation

Again I would like to emphasize that Garrett’s approach has virtues as well as dangers, and for a scholar it is fascinating to see how he weaves together Hume’s different discussions, apparently determined to paint a coherent picture of his philosophy. Regarding that philosophy, he writes, “I am firmly convinced of its overall consistency and coherence, and the organization of this book is intended to highlight those features” (*Hume*, xxi). Fairly often this involves developing Hume’s positions, pointing out what view “he must” take, on pain of inconsistency or other error (for example, *Hume*, 57, 113, 148, 216, 305), and apparently with the implicit assumption that Hume could not be guilty of any such error. Sometimes these claims are convincing, but I would prefer to see more of that “doubt, and caution, and modesty, which, in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought for ever to accompany a just reasoner” (EHU 12.24; SBN 162). Otherwise the risk is that one loses track of the boundary between Hume’s view and the interpreter’s, and in some cases I fear that this may have happened in Garrett’s text.

Consider two examples from chapter 2, on “Perceptions and Their Principles.” The first of these concerns Hume’s theory of abstract ideas, which Garrett takes to inform a great deal of his philosophy. After outlining the theory, Garrett comments, “If Hume’s theory of abstract ideas is to explain the full range of cases he intends it to cover, at least four fairly obvious elaborations must be made beyond those that he explicitly offers” (*Hume*, 55). These are that an abstract idea of a *relation* must involve a “revival set” of pairs (or multiples) rather than singletons, that there should be abstract ideas of *individuals*, and that judgments can involve
both an expanded revival set (of things conceived but not necessarily believed) and an idealized revival set (Hume, 55–56). Moreover, in explicating T 1.1.7.14 (SBN 23), Garrett goes on to argue that Humean abstract ideas must involve in addition what he calls a concept’s “inferential role” and “conceptual role” (Hume, 57), going well beyond anything implied by that passage. In this paragraph of Garrett’s, it is striking that we get references to nine sections of his own book against just the one to Hume’s own text, suggesting a focus on what Garrett thinks Hume ought to have said rather than what he did say: rational reconstruction rather than interpretation. Yet the reconstruction starts with the categorical statement that “[e]xplaining the full meaning of an abstract idea or concept therefore involves, in principle, several elements for Hume” (Hume, 57, my emphasis). In the remainder of the book, Garrett applies his reconstructed theory of abstract ideas to the understanding of a wide range of Hume’s philosophy, including what he calls the “sense-based concepts,” which are expounded at length in chapter 4 (with the normative subset discussed further in chapter 5) and which provide perhaps the most distinctive central theme of his interpretation. Personally, I doubt that Hume’s theory of abstract ideas had so significant an influence, and I see little to suggest that Hume seriously engaged with the problems that Garrett identifies as requiring its further development, nor—if he did—that he saw how to deal with them. His theory may be referred to in half a dozen or so sections of the Treatise (“quite often,” according to Garrett, Hume, 37), but usually without any allusion to the role of custom that distinguishes it from Berkeley’s theory; moreover, Hume’s only explicit mention of it after the Treatise is in a first Enquiry footnote, where he suggests that it might provide “the readiest solution” to the paradoxes of infinite divisibility (EHU 12.20n34; SBN 158n). Garrett’s attempts to develop a more powerful Humean theory are very interesting in themselves, and I would accept that if this theory can make good sense of texts that would otherwise be incoherent, then we should be prepared to consider it as suggestive of genuine tendencies in Hume’s own thought. Any such development, however, is bound to be highly controversial, so even in the best case it remains desirable to see clear boundaries drawn between the texts and their speculative interpretation.

A second example is provided by Garrett’s interpretation of Hume’s view of negation. We are told that “the simple absence of belief-constituting liveliness would not be denial, but rather mere absence of assent. . . . Accordingly, [Hume] is obliged to explain the mental denial of a proposition in terms of a positive belief in its contrary, and this in turn raises the question of how he understands contrariety” (Hume, 75). Garrett then acknowledges the “initially puzzling” nature of Hume’s cursory comments on contrariety (at T 1.1.5.8; SBN 15) and goes on to say: “To understand this remark fully, we must distinguish between a conceptualized and a non-conceptualized way of representing the non-existence of something” (Hume, 75). The ensuing discussion—attempting to defend Hume by appeal to
his theory of abstract ideas—is interesting and philosophically sophisticated, but notice how Garrett has moved from a claim about what Hume “is obliged” to think to the claim that this position is essential “to understand” what Hume actually wrote. It seems to me implausible that Hume had these sophisticated thoughts in mind. Rather, I believe that his treatment of contrariety—as his text suggests—is ill-considered and cursory, motivated mainly by the recognition that his artificial taxonomy of relations requires some notion of negation, but providing no satisfactory treatment of it. That taxonomy itself seems to be an attempt to shoehorn Locke’s theory of relations into a sevenfold structure, prompted by the seductive idea that the nature of the relations involved in a proposition can provide a reliable criterion of demonstrability (as applied at T 1.3.3.2 and 3.1.1.19 [SBN 79, 463–64]). But sadly, the would-be criterion is nonsense, as Jonathan Bennett showed long ago (Locke, Berkeley, Hume, 256), since (for example) it is entirely possible for demonstrable statements to involve relations from the supposedly “non-demonstrable” class. In the first Enquiry, there is no trace of this dubious theory of relations, and Hume’s sole criterion of demonstrability is based on his Conceivability Principle, which has no such evident weaknesses. Garrett, however, seeks to defend the original theory and builds on his elaborated interpretation of Humean abstract ideas to suggest a possible way in which “knowledge of such truths as [all dogs are mammals] could be accommodated within the constraints of the four knowledge-underwriting kinds of relations” (Hume, 92–93). But there is no evidence in the text of the Treatise that Hume has seriously thought through the application of his “knowledge-underwriting” theory of relations (let alone in combination with his theory of abstract ideas), and some evidence in the first Enquiry that he had by then abandoned it. All this effort at subtle defense of the Treatise theory, therefore, provides interesting philosophical discussion, but it does not thereby provide plausible interpretation. No doubt the book is richer for it, but I would have liked to see a clearer distinction maintained between Hume’s own views and Garrett’s speculative developments of them.

3. A Last-Minute Footnote and a Disputed Distinction

Garrett’s third chapter is devoted to “The mind and its faculties” and, like the second, aims to provide a general structured overview of central aspects of Hume’s philosophy prior to the more detailed discussion of specific topics in the later chapters. As Garrett explains in his preface, this arrangement has expository advantages over the “more obvious and common method of simply devoting successive chapters to coverage of individual topics,” making it easier to understand the overall framework of Hume’s philosophy and to see its “coherence . . . and the consistency of his results” (Hume, xxi). As might be expected, Garrett presents his overviews persuasively and elegantly. But an obvious risk of this overview
approach—especially in the hands of an interpreter with Garrett’s commitments and sympathies—is that Hume’s philosophy will be presented as having greater consistency than it actually does, by downplaying changes in his views, ignoring controversies, or simply selective focus. For example, the first main section of this chapter is devoted to “Mind and Consciousness,” centered around Hume’s theory of personal identity and giving prominence to the implications of his Separability Principle (as expounded earlier in chapter 2, *Hume*, 46–47). And although the doubts Hume expresses in the notorious 1740 *Treatise* Appendix are mentioned at the end of this section, no hint is given that this aspect of Hume’s philosophy is particularly unclear in respect of his views subsequent to the *Treatise*. Personal identity does not feature in the first *Enquiry*, nor does the Separability Principle, which commits the *Treatise* to such absurd and implausible results about the independence of perceptions. There is a serious risk here that views published in January 1739 and retracted in October 1740 are given greater prominence than those published—and repeatedly revised—from 1748 until Hume’s death in 1776, in works which Hume himself insisted should be taken as authoritative.

In the next section of chapter 3, Garrett turns his attention to “imagination and memory,” putting great emphasis on a distinction between what he calls “inclusive imagination” and “unreasoning imagination” (terms he then continues to use in the remainder of the book) as expounded by Hume in the following famous footnote:

> In general we may observe, that as our assent to all probable reasonings is founded on the vivacity of ideas, it resembles many of those whimsies and prejudices, which are rejected under the opprobrious character of being the offspring of the imagination. By this expression it appears that the word, *imagination*, is commonly us’d in two different senses; and tho’ nothing be more contrary to true philosophy, than this inaccuracy, yet in the following reasonings I have often been oblig’d to fall into it. When I oppose the imagination to the memory, I mean the faculty, by which we form our fainter ideas. When I oppose it to reason, I mean the same faculty, excluding only our demonstrative and probable reasonings. *(T 1.3.9.19n22; SBN 117–18n)*

What Garrett does not mention is that Hume inserted this “important footnote” (*Hume*, 87) at the very last minute, by means of a specially printed cancel leaf that readers were asked to substitute physically into the already-printed volume. To enable this to be done, moreover, he had to craft it to fit into a very limited space, compress some of his existing text, and place the note at the end of the section rather than where it most naturally belongs. So Hume evidently considered the distinction drawn in the footnote to be important (as Garrett states) but was very
restricted in what he could say. This might naturally lead us to expect it to be a
distinction that Hume already had firmly in mind as the Treatise went to press,
but which had not featured explicitly in the text of the Treatise prior to the inser-
tion of the footnote. We might also expect that the footnote is unlikely, given the
constraints of timing and space, to provide a comprehensive explanation of that
distinction.

To put the footnote in philosophical context, it is important to bear in mind
that for Hume, all thinking involves ideas of the imagination as traditionally un-
derstood, since our ideas are all imagistic (consisting of impression-copy content)
rather than purely intellectual (see T 1.3.1.7; SBN 72). In this broad sense, there-
fore, the “imagination” can be conceived of as something like a virtual “canvas”
on which those sensory (or reflective) images appear. (Of course the imagination
incorporates ideas of other sensory modes beside vision, to which the analogy of
a “canvas” is less appropriate.) But Hume also wants to use the word “imagina-
tion” in a narrower sense, distinguished from “reason,” thus requiring a division
amongst the principles that affect our ideas between those that count as “reason”
and those that do not. The footnote suggests that the distinction is being drawn
between “our demonstrative and probable reasonings” and everything else, thus
supporting Garrett’s interpretation of Humean “reason” as a purely inferential
faculty (88–89, 184). However, I do not believe that this can possibly be Hume’s
view, for, most strikingly, it would immediately imply that intuitive transitions be-
tween our ideas—what he refers to as intuitive “arguments” (T 1.3.14.35; SBN 172),
inference” (EHU 4.21; SBN 37), or “proof” (T 2.3.2.2; SBN 408; EHU 8.22n18;
SBN 94n)—would have to be assigned to imagination in the narrower rather than
the broader sense, thus falling outside the province of “reason.”

The most obvious objection to such a categorization lies in the fact that the
vast majority of early-modern philosophers saw intuition as a function of reason,
and I shall return to this shortly. But also, Hume’s own footnote text—despite
the superficial impression to the contrary—strongly suggests that he must be of
the same view. For the clear motivation behind his footnote is to distinguish the
operations of “reason” from “those whimsies and prejudices which are rejected
under the opprobrious character of being the offspring of the imagination,” and
neither Hume nor philosophical common sense would ever suggest that intu-
tion—the supposedly rock-solid basis of demonstration—should be classed with
the “whimsies and prejudices.”

These three points—the footnote’s last-minute haste, its brevity, and its appar-
et motivation—already give good reason to suspect that it is strictly inaccurate in
“excluding only our demonstrative and probable reasonings” from imagination in
its narrower, “opprobrious” sense. But there is further strong evidence in the later
text of the Treatise, which as mentioned above might reasonably be expected to
show some recognition of this ambiguity in “the imagination,” given that Hume
judged it sufficiently important to require the trouble and expense of last-minute editing and page reprinting in section 1.3.9.

It was perhaps when writing about “unphilosophical probability” that Hume first recognized that he faces a challenge in distinguishing between “the judgment and imagination,” given that “[a]ccording to [Hume’s] system, all reasonings are nothing but the effects of custom; and custom has no influence, but by enlivening the imagination” (T 1.3.13.11; SBN 149). In answer to this, he distinguishes between “general rules” that are “attributed to our judgment; as being more extensive and constant,” and prejudices, which are “attributed . . . to the imagination; as being more capricious and uncertain.” Essentially the same challenge arises after his attack on “the antient philosophers” for being “guided by every trivial propensity of the imagination” (T 1.4.3.11; SBN 224), given that “the imagination, according to my own confession, [is] the ultimate judge of all systems of philosophy” (T 1.4.4.1; SBN 225). In response, Hume famously distinguishes “in the imagination betwixt the principles which are permanent, irresistible, and universal; such as the customary transition from causes to effects, and from effects to causes: And the principles, which are changeable, weak and irregular” (T 1.4.3.11; SBN 224). This is later echoed in the conclusion to Book 1, where he refers to “the understanding, that is, . . . the general and more establish’d properties of the imagination” (T 1.4.7.7; SBN 267), contrasting these with “trivial suggestions of the fancy” (T 1.4.7.7; SBN 267). In all of these places, Hume is quite explicit that a distinction is being drawn between different principles that operate on (ideas in) the imagination and drawn not in terms of parts of the mind but rather on the basis of distinguishing between disciplined, rational thought and unconstrained fantasy—that is, depending on whether or not the relevant principles are respectable and reliable.

The last-minute footnote begins in exactly the same spirit: “In general we may observe, that as our assent to all probable reasonings is founded on the vivacity of ideas, it resembles many of those whimsies and prejudices, which are rejected under the opprobrious character of being the offspring of the imagination. By this expression it appears that the word, imagination, is commonly us’d in two different senses” (T 1.3.9.19n22; SBN 117–18n). Garrett never notes this clear connexion between the footnote and the later passages—indeed, as far as I can tell, he does not ever discuss those passages. This is particularly surprising in respect of the famous paragraph at T 1.4.4.1 (SBN 225–26), which is extremely prominent in Hume’s text and explicitly presents a distinction “in the imagination” which he states to be necessary “[i]n order to justify myself.” Given the importance that Garrett ascribes to the similar distinction in the T 1.3.9 (last-minute) footnote and his evident interest in Treatise 1.4.7 (discussed in his chapter 7), this is also unfortunate. Although I do not have space to debate the matter here, I believe it is the undermining of the T 1.4.4.1 distinction, spelled out in Hume’s “dangerous
dilemma” at T 1.4.7.6–7 (SBN 267–68), that is mainly responsible for the skeptical despair he expresses in the conclusion of Book 1, and unlike Garrett, I take this undermining to be genuinely problematic for the philosophy of the Treatise and a significant factor in Hume’s later expressed dissatisfaction with it. (See my “Chief Argument,” section 5.)

To maintain his position regarding the interpretation of the last-minute footnote, Garrett must presumably claim that Hume had in mind two quite separate distinctions amongst the principles that operate on our ideas, drawn on apparently similar grounds and with considerable overlap, yet one of them is expressed in the final text of the Treatise only within a hastily-composed footnote, and the two distinctions are never mentioned together. This seems so implausible that I consider it overwhelmingly likely that in the footnote Hume is alluding to the very same distinction that he will later be introducing in his main text, most explicitly at T 1.4.4.1 (SBN 225). But if this is correct, then the distinction cannot fit Garrett’s interpretation, because it is based not on whether the relevant principles are specific to argument or inference but quite clearly on their solidity and respectability. The “general and more establish’d” side of the boundary will thus include the principles of demonstration and induction but also of intuition and presumably belief in body, while the “trivial” side will include unreasoned associational fantasies, prejudicial inferences, and the irrational reasoning of the person “who is tormented he knows not why, with the apprehension of spectres in the dark” (T 1.4.4.1; SBN 225–26). It is readily understandable why Hume, thinking along these lines, would wish to categorize the latter as “imaginative” in a narrower sense than just in respect of their involving ideas in the imagination. But it would be bizarre if—as Garrett seems to imply—he intended thus to class them together with the intuition of “relations of ideas.”

4. Reason, the Understanding, and Induction

Though we disagree on the interpretation of the distinction that Hume draws within the principles that operate on ideas in the imagination, Garrett and I both see this as hugely important in Hume’s philosophy. But whereas I would put more weight on it in respect of the philosophy of Treatise Book 1 part 4 (where I believe it is most explicitly introduced and discussed), in Garrett’s book its greatest impact seems to be on the interpretation of part 3, and specifically, of Hume’s argument concerning induction. Garrett and I have been debating Hume’s treatment of induction for many years, and I have learned a great deal as a result, modifying my own position significantly in the process. In his chapter 6, many of his points seem to be pre-emptive moves against criticisms that I and others have made, but since at the end of that chapter he generously mentions the recent paper in which I have most fully urged these criticisms (“‘Scepticism’ about Induction”), I shall
leave the adjudication of most of this discussion as “an exercise for the reader” and continue to focus more specifically on his interpretation of the faculties.

In *Cognition and Commitment*, Garrett appealed to the precedent of Locke (and Locke only) when introducing his controversial claim that Humean “reason” is “simply the inferential or argumentative faculty of the mind” (*Hume*, 85). This straightforward attribution to Locke is disputable, but we can put that aside for now. At the time, Garrett took Humean “understanding” to be broader than “reason,” and in subsequent discussion (starting with my “Hume on Reason,” 157–58n7), I argued against this on the basis of numerous passages in which Hume apparently equates “reason” with “the understanding.” Garrett—again generously—notes and now accepts this (*Hume*, 89) but then gives a response that I find very surprising, claiming that Hume typically employs “the understanding” in a way that is also narrowly inferential, thus preserving the equivalence while hanging on to his interpretation of “reason.”

This is historically implausible. And it can also be opposed using an objection that Garrett himself has urged repeatedly in the past against those (including myself) who have postulated an ambiguity in Hume’s notion of reason, usually in connection with his argument concerning induction. To that claim of ambiguity, Garrett responded:

[N]owhere in the argument or elsewhere does Hume stipulate, or even imply, that he is employing a special or restricted sense of that term [viz. ‘reason’]. By way of contrast, consider Hume’s procedure when he narrows his sense of the term ‘probability’ at *Treatise* I.iii.11. . . . Not only does he give explicit warning that he is doing so, he devotes an entire page to explaining and justifying his decision. . . . Presumably, . . . Hume has not explained his use of the term ‘reason’ up to this point . . . [because] he has been following the common Lockean usage of that term. (*Cognition and Commitment*, 85)

Now, however, Garrett is himself postulating an unannounced ambiguity in Hume’s use of the phrase “the understanding,” contrary not only to Lockean usage (dating from 50 years before Hume) but also to the usage—so far as I can tell—of every other prominent philosopher of the intervening period. Garrett gives an interesting explanation of why Hume’s discoveries might push in this direction and be consistent with such a narrowing (*Hume*, 89–90), but this fails to answer the objection and does nothing in itself to justify the claim of narrowing. If the evidence of the T 1.3.9 footnote is as weak as I have argued above, and Garrett cannot appeal to Lockean usage to support his position (since any Lockean support for his interpretation of reason is at the very least counterbalanced by comparable objections to his interpretation of the understanding), then little independent
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evidence remains for his key claim that the Humean faculty of reason is confined to demonstrative and probable reasoning (with intuition thus excluded).

The only other significant evidence that Garrett seems to offer is his reference to Hume’s tendency “to argue that various mental operations cannot be produced ‘by reason’ solely on the grounds that they can be produced neither by demonstrative reasoning, nor by probable reasoning” (Hume, 92), and here he alludes to T 1.3.6.4, 2.3.3.2, and 3.1.1.18 (SBN 89, 413–14, 463). But this evidence is also quite weak. As I argue in “Sceptical Doubts” (128–30, 155–56) and “‘Scepticism’ about Induction,” (67–68), the argument in Treatise 1.3.6 is far more fully developed in the first Enquiry, where Hume takes the trouble to rule out both sensation and intuition as support for his Uniformity Principle before even considering demonstrative and probable reasoning.24 Moreover the absence of these points from the much more cursory Treatise discussion is easy to explain: Hume presumably just took it to be obvious (as have many of his commentators) that uniformity into the future cannot be justified either by appeal to current sensation or by intuition. A similar point can be made in respect of Treatise 2.3.3.2 (SBN 413–14), particularly given Hume’s gloss there of “demonstration” as “regard[ing] the abstract relations of ideas”—a gloss that would implicitly include intuition. Likewise, at Treatise 3.1.1.18 (SBN 463), Hume’s contrast is drawn not between demonstration and probability but between “the comparing of ideas” and “the inferring of matter of fact”—again, the former would include intuition. Quite apart from this, it is clear from Hume’s writings that he almost universally thinks of intuition (which he rarely mentions explicitly) as paired with demonstration: the only significant case where he explicitly draws a significant contrast between them is at T 1.3.1.2 (SBN 70) in connection with his theory of relations. This by itself makes it implausible to suggest that he would assign them to different faculties. Moreover, in a well-known footnote, Hume explicitly rejects the “vulgar division of the acts of the understanding, into conception, judgment, and reasoning” (T 1.3.7.5n20; SBN 96–97n), which also counts strongly against the claim that he himself would place the last of these in a separate faculty from the others.25

Even if this were not enough, we find in the Treatise and every one of the three “recast” volumes, explicit definitions of “reason” not in terms of inference but rather “truth and falsehood”; moreover two of these occur precisely in the sections to which Garrett appeals in the final evidence that we have just considered. Thus, Hume calls reason the faculty “which judges of truth and falshood” (T 2.3.3.8; SBN 417), words echoed in the Dissertation on the Passions where he says “reason, in a strict sense, as meaning the judgment of truth and falsehood” (DP 5.1).26 At T 3.1.1.9 (SBN 458), Hume states that “[r]eason is the discovery of truth or falshood”; in the original edition of the first Enquiry this becomes “[t]hat faculty, by which we discern Truth and Falshood” (EHU 1.1, original footnote); and in the second Enquiry we read that “reason . . . conveys the knowledge of truth and
falsehood” (EPM App. 1.21; SBN 294). As I have argued elsewhere, this usage is absolutely in line with that of most of Hume’s contemporaries, giving further strength to the claim that Humean “reason” is standardly the faculty of cognition rather than merely of inference. There is much more that could be said here, since I also believe that it is very hard to make sense of Hume’s arguments—notably concerning induction—in Garrett’s terms, and this would furnish yet more pressure against his interpretation of the Humean faculties. But since, as I say, these matters have been discussed extensively elsewhere and space here is limited, I shall now leave them aside.

5. Sense-Based Concepts and Morality

One of the most distinctive aspects of Garrett’s interpretation—developed especially in his fourth and fifth chapters—is his extension of the parallel between causation and morality as a model for a notion of “sense-based” concepts, which, he claims, informs Hume’s philosophy as a whole, contributing significantly to its “originality, coherence, and power” (Hume, 5). Such sense-based concepts include not only causation, virtue, and vice but also color, beauty, deformity, and probability. All of these, Garrett thinks (following on from his illuminating discussions of causation and virtue in earlier works), are susceptible of paired—but equivalent—definitions in a similar style, one “productive” (in terms of producing an appropriate impression) and one “responsive” (in terms of the relevant objective conditions). In consequence of this, these concepts are also “susceptible in principle to a systematic ambiguity” and a related “particular kind of disagreement in application that results from their essential relation to a standard of judgment” (Hume, 125–26). Two other features they share are “a particular kind of simplicity” (Hume, 123) and “a certain general resistance to global error” (Hume, 127). This is fascinating stuff, but there is a great deal of interpretation going on here, with few instances of texts that directly confirm Hume’s endorsement of these claims over the entire range—for example, paired definitions are to be found only in the cases of causation (or causal necessity) and virtue (or personal merit), and Hume never refers to any “sense” of causation or of probability. Comprehensive critical appraisal would be a major task, so I shall here make do with some brief observations suggesting that Garrett’s highly systematic picture of Hume’s philosophy faces problems even in the central case of our moral concepts.

Garrett apparently takes inspiration from Kemp Smith’s suggestion that the guiding principle of Hume’s system is an extension to the theoretical realm of the moral sentimentalism that he learned from Francis Hutcheson, with aesthetic and moral judgements becoming the model for “sense-based” concepts as a whole (Hume, 19, 115). All this is interesting, and the parallels often illuminating, but one might find the extent of Garrett’s emphasis rather misleading given that
Hume refers to a “moral sense” only twice in his philosophical writings, once in the heading of Treatise 3.1.2, “Moral distinctions deriv’d from a moral sense,” and once when referring back to it: “Were nothing esteem’d virtue but what were beneficial to society, I am persuaded, that the foregoing explication of the moral sense ought still to be receiv’d, and that upon sufficient evidence.” (T 3.3.1.25; SBN 588).

Moreover, given Hume’s desire to recommend his work to Hutcheson (a factor particularly evident in the re-written Treatise 3.3.6, which Hume edited specially for that purpose,29 I suspect that he is here somewhat misdescribing the tendency of his theory. Admittedly, he refers rather more to a “sense of morals,” “sense of virtue,” and “sense of justice,”30 but these are mostly generic references to moral judgment—just as when Hume repeatedly refers to a “sense of interest” without (I take it) any suggestion that assessing our own interest requires some distinctive sense. (See T 3.2.2.10, 3.2.2.22, 3.2.5.11, 3.2.9.4; SBN 490, 498, 522, 553.) Such references therefore do little to justify the idea of morality as involving some special sense of the kind that Hutcheson hypothesized.

Perhaps the passages in the Treatise that come nearer than any others are these:

To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. . . . We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous. The case is the same as in our judgments concerning all kinds of beauty, and tastes, and sensations. Our approbation is imply’d in the immediate pleasure they convey to us. (T 3.1.2.3; SBN 471)

[W]e may farther confirm the foregoing proposition, that those impressions, which give rise to this sense of justice, are not natural to the mind of man, but arise from artifice and human conventions. (T 3.2.2.21; SBN 496)

The nearest in the second Enquiry are where Hume describes the “controversy . . . concerning the general foundation of morals; whether they be derived from reason, or from sentiment; whether we attain the knowledge of them by a chain of argument and induction, or by an immediate feeling and finer internal sense” (EPM 1.3; SBN 170) and goes on to anticipate his conclusion that “[t]he final sentence . . . which pronounces characters and actions amiable or odious, praise-worthy or blameable . . . depends on some internal sense or feeling” (EPM 1.9; SBN 172–73). In the first appendix, when he turns to consider these issues in detail, Hume does not describe his theory as involving a sense at all, and indeed at EPM App 1.6 (SBN 287–88), he seems to be treating a sentiment as contrasting
with a cognitive account in terms of a “sense or faculty.” Overall, the terms moral sentiment and taste seem more faithful to his view than talking of a moral sense.

Certainly Hume is a sentimentalist, who sees our sentiments or feelings as playing a crucial role in moral thinking and judgment. If this is what Garrett means in calling him a “moral sense theorist,” it is perhaps unexceptionable. But if the term is intended to ally him with predecessors such as Hutcheson, then that would be at least to some extent misleading. For Hutcheson, “the Understanding, or Reason, . . . [is] attended with an higher sort of Sensations” which “represent” some things “as Good” and others “as Evil” (Essay, 32n). So these Hutchesonian senses report to reason or the understanding—which he at any rate considers to be the faculty that judges truth and falsehood—quite distinct from the will which encompasses “the calm desire of good, and aversion to evil” (Essay, 31). This seems a long way from Hume’s famous arguments of T 3.1.1, which argue that morality cannot be derived from reason on the ground that reason “is the discovery of truth or falshood”.

Further discussion of this, however, would bring us back to the debate on Hume’s notion of reason, which would presumably need to be settled first.

So I shall end this section by briefly linking the discussion of Hume’s moral theory and its supposed “sense-based” character with my earlier comments about the (arguably excessive) coherence—both between topics and over time—that Garrett finds in Hume’s philosophy. In the Treatise, good and evil are repeatedly identified with pleasure and pain (T 2.1.1.4, 2.3.1.1, 2.3.9.1, 2.3.9.8, 3.1.2.4; SBN 276, 399, 438, 439, 471–72), and Hume’s predominant theory of motivation is in terms of the personal pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain (T 2.3.3.3; SBN 414). He also identifies “the distinguishing impressions, by which moral good or evil is known” as particular pleasures and pains (T 3.1.2.3, 3.1.2.6; SBN 471, 473), and thus gets close to something like a sense-based theory, because “as . . . pleasure or pain cannot be unknown to the person who feels it, it follows, that there is just so much vice or virtue in any character, as every one places in it, and that ’tis impossible in this particular we can ever be mistaken” (T 3.2.8.8; SBN 547; see also T 2.1.7.4–5; SBN 295–96). So morality is indeed felt rather than “judged of” (T 3.1.2.1; SBN 470) and has that “resistance to global error” (Hume, 127) which Garrett takes to be characteristic of sense-based concepts in general. However, the passage just quoted from T 3.2.8.8 (SBN 547) seems to be Garrett’s only relatively clear textual Humean authority for ascribing such error-resistance to what he identifies as Hume’s “sense-based concepts,” in which case the change in Hume’s view that I shall now describe seems potentially of wider significance for his interpretation.

By the time Hume comes to write the second Enquiry, his view of moral appraisal has developed, and his presentation of it perhaps even more so. He no longer argues that morality is “more properly felt than judg’d of” and emphasizes
instead the joint role of reason and sentiment, with sentiment declaring “the final sentence” (EPM 1.9; SBN 172) in favor of virtue, while reason does the bulk of the work, identifying the practical tendencies of characters to foster usefulness or agreeableness to oneself or others. Thus, prior to making a moral judgment, “it is often necessary, we find, that much reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be made, just conclusions drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated relations examined, and general facts fixed and ascertained” (EPM 1.9; SBN 173). Since usefulness is such a key part of morality, “it is evident, that reason must enter for a considerable share in all decisions of this kind; since nothing but that faculty can instruct us in the tendency of qualities and actions, and point out their beneficial consequences to society and to their possessor” (EPM App 1.2; SBN 285). Reason thus does most of the heavy lifting, after which the sentiment of humanity—“a feeling for the happiness of mankind, and a resentment of their misery”—delivers the moral verdict “in favour of those [tendencies], which are useful and beneficial” (EPM App 1.3; SBN 286). In the second Enquiry, Hume could no longer say “that there is just so much vice or virtue in any character, as every one places in it, and that ’tis impossible in this particular we can ever be mistaken” (T 3.2.8.8; SBN 547); indeed, his stinging attack on the “monkish virtues” highlights how mistaken people can be (EPM 9.3; SBN 270). Garrett must look elsewhere, therefore, for strong and enduring textual evidence to support his claim of “resistance to global error” in Humean “sense-based” concepts.

6. Religion

Following his introductory chapter and the four that develop the general framework of his interpretation with “implications . . . across multiple areas of philosophy,” Garrett devotes four chapters to narrower topics, with chapter 6 on “Induction and Causation,” chapter 7 on “Skepticism and Probability,” chapter 8 on “Morality and Virtue,” and chapter 9 on “Religion and God.” Having said something above on all of these except the last, I shall conclude with a brief review of Garrett’s treatment of Hume on religion. The chapter provides very useful summary and discussion of Hume’s treatments of religious belief, the Design Argument, the “argument a priori” (from Dialogues 9), the problem of evil, “true religion,” miracles, and the relation between religion and morality.

Hume’s writings on religion are commonly taken to be insincere in various ways, but Garrett prefers to interpret them without resort to irony or theological lying. He nevertheless finds sufficient nuance and qualification in Hume’s (and Philo’s) relatively positive statements to indicate a coherent view of religion that can properly be described as “infidel” (a term which Garrett prefers to “atheist” Hume, 312–13). Considerations of space no doubt required some selectivity (so, for example, the topics of immortality and a “future state”—though mentioned...
at Hume, 22, 27–28, and 284— are not discussed here), but overall the chapter provides a reliable, efficient, and well-balanced discussion of most of the main themes of Hume’s treatment of religion. This will be especially valuable for teachers and students, given how few books on Hume provide anything similar.

My own biggest debate with chapter 9 would concern Hume’s argument on miracles, which Garrett interprets as requiring a sharp distinction between “proofs” (definitive of laws of nature and hence of miracles) and “probabilities” (Hume, 304, 306). By contrast, I see the argument as arising from general probabilistic considerations, with “proofs” as just an extreme case (thus avoiding the potential criticism that treating them quite differently will simply beg the question against miracles). Garrett generously references my interpretation (Hume, 313–14), commenting—correctly—that it “cannot fully vindicate or sustain Hume’s argument” (Hume, 306), while acknowledging that his own interpretation raises its own philosophical questions (Hume, 305–306). The texts give no clear verdict, and there is plenty of scope for interesting discussion, which I look forward to pursuing on a later occasion. As so often, Garrett’s interpretation—though of course disputable—combines deep philosophical understanding and ingenuity, sensitivity to the text, and overall plausibility. And in this very rich book there are many other examples of such cases, with great potential to add to the interest of future Hume scholarship. Garrett’s Hume is a fine contribution to that scholarship, and it will no doubt continue to provoke both objections and approval—often from the very same sources—for a long time to come!

NOTES

1 References to the second Enquiry are to Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Beauchamp, cited in the text as “EPM” followed by section and paragraph numbers, and to Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. Selby-Bigge and Nidditch, cited in the text as “SBN” followed by page number.

2 Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion are cited in the text as “DNR” followed by part and paragraph numbers.

3 As these examples suggest, the word “never” in the secondary literature (much like the word “surely” in student essays) very often signposts a point worthy of critical scrutiny.

4 An instance analogous to the “justified” example above is Garrett’s statement in Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy that “Hume does not use ‘evidence’ as a term of epistemic evaluation at all. On the contrary, he consistently uses it to mean ‘evidentness’” (Cognition and Commitment, 228). Now he has changed his mind, presenting this as an example of a word which is systematically ambiguous (Hume, 141),
and citing EHU 10.4 (SBN 110) as an example on the other side (a section to which I had referred in contesting the original claim when discussing that book in “Reason and Induction,” 159).


Abstract or general ideas are mentioned or alluded to at T 1.1.7, 1.2.3.56, 1.2.4.12, 1.3.14.13, 1.4.3.10, 2.3.6.2, and T App. 2; SBN 1725, 345, 43, 1612, 224, 4245, 623, but few of these passages give any hint of the detail of Hume’s own theory, so it is unclear how often he has it specifically in mind. *Treatise* 1.3.6.15 and 2.3.1.16; (SBN 93, 405) can also be construed as alluding to the theory (as Garrett has pointed out to me), though Hume’s talk of objects which have been found constantly conjoined does not by itself indicate that he is referring to a revival set of pairs of instances (let alone, in the case of the idea of causation itself at *Treatise* 2.3.1.16, a revival set of revival sets of pairs).

Hume’s shoehorning involves an argument that all of the relations that Locke classified as “natural” (T 1.1.4.3; SBN 11–12) and “instituted” (T 1.1.4.5; SBN 12) fall under the category of causation. But there are plenty of propositions involving these relations that are intuitively or demonstratively certain, for example, “every grandmother is a mother.”

When discussing the argument concerning induction in section 4 of the *Enquiry*, Garrett claims to identify “a tacit employment of the Separability Principle” (*Hume*, 176). But this is unconvincing and question-begging: the text makes perfect sense without any such dependence. In my “Context, Aims, and Structure,” I briefly explain how the Separability Principle is intimately connected to several of the distinctive theses that are absent from the first *Enquiry* (50–51n37).

Garrett’s text omits this comma, and replaces Hume’s “vivacity” with “liveliness.”

It seems to me extremely likely that Hume appreciated the need for this new note on re-reading the end of paragraph T 1.3.9.4: “All this, and every thing else, which I believe, are nothing but ideas; tho’ by their force and settled order, arising from custom and the relation of cause and effect, they distinguish themselves from the other ideas, which are merely the offspring of the imagination” (SBN 108). This raises exactly the issue addressed in the footnote and is the only other place in any of Hume’s publications that mentions “the offspring of the imagination.” If the footnote was not prompted by this paragraph, then the coincidence of phraseology and appropriateness would be very surprising.

Hume contrasts ideas of the imagination with ideas of *memory*, but his theory seems to be that when we call on our memory in thought, new ideas in the imagination are copied from those of memory (T 1.3.9.7; SBN 110), so it is usually more appropriate to refer to *impressions* of the memory, as he frequently does (T 1.3.4.1, 1.3.4.3, 1.3.6.3–7,
13 Hume refers frequently to “the judgment” in the course of his psychological discussions at T 1.3.9–13, but never again in Book 1. What he says at T 1.3.13.11 (SBN 149) matches closely with what he will later say about “the understanding,” and the passage at T 3.3.4.13 (SBN 613) displays clear alternation between “the judgment” and “the understanding,” suggesting an equivalence. Also relevant here is the footnote at T 1.3.7.5n20 (SBN 96–97n), which rejects the standard “division of the acts of the understanding, into conception, judgment and reasoning.”

14 Hume goes on to make reference to “the more general and authentic operations of the understanding,” and “the most establish’d principles of reasoning” (T 1.3.13.12; SBN 150), but the extent of these descriptions is not exactly clear.

15 Unfortunately, the book does not contain an index of references to passages in Hume’s works, and its index did not help me here (for example, no entries for “modern philosophy,” “permanent,” “general,” “irregular,” or “trivial”), so I cannot be completely certain of this.

16 Garrett sees a resolution to these skeptical concerns at T 1.4.7.11 (SBN 270) in what he calls Hume’s “Title Principle” (Hume, 228–36), but I find this very unconvincing. Superstitious reasoning is frequently “lively, and mixes itself with some propensity,” but Hume would not wish to endorse it, so the canvassed principle gives no solid criterion for discrimination. Nor do I see any evidence in the structure of the Treatise text (nor indeed in any other primary text) that it has anything like the prominence in Hume’s thought that Garrett ascribes to it.

17 Although Hume states that the belief in body is based on “trivial qualities of the fancy” (T 1.4.2.56; SBN 217), he seems to consider the belief itself permanent, irresistible, and universal, with the possible temporary exception of those who are intensely contemplating skeptical arguments (for example, T 1.4.2.1, 1.4.2.56–57; SBN 187, 217–18; EHU 12.7; SBN 151).

18 Hume says here that such a tormented individual “may, perhaps, be said to reason, and to reason naturally too,” expressing some hesitation that can be explained both on Garrett’s view and my own (according to which Humean “reason” standardly refers to the general faculty of cognition). But Hume goes on to insist that even if this does count as reasoning, its pathological nature leaves it on the “changeable, weak, and irregular” side of his distinction—thus confirming that it is respectability rather than ratiocination which is the crucial criterion.

19 See my “Sceptical Doubts,” section 2 for discussion of these matters. Locke’s own usage of “reason” is more variable than Garrett seems to suggest, and indeed his chapter “Of Reason” begins with the observation that “The Word Reason in the English Language has different significations” (Essay, 4.17.1).

20 There is a tension here with a response that Garrett made to an earlier criticism when I pointed out that Hume’s argument as presented in the Enquiry explicitly rules
out intuition as well as demonstration and probable reasoning as a basis for the Uniformity Principle (Millican, “Hume on Reason,” 151–52). Garrett’s reply acknowledges but deflects the point, stating that “[a]t the same time that Hume expands his argument in the Enquiry, . . . he also expands the famous conclusion to rule out any ‘reasoning or process of the understanding,’ thereby eliminating such non-inferential processes of the understanding as intuition or the perception of a probable connection between even a single ‘proof’ and a conclusion” (Cognition and Commitment, 184).

21 Like many others, I once considered an ambiguity in Humean “reason” to be mandated by the interpretation of Hume’s argument concerning induction. Pressure from Garrett, based partly on the objection discussed here, was a significant factor in my relinquishing such a claim of ambiguity, and in my “‘Scepticism’ about Induction,” I abandon it completely (see particularly 82–83).

22 For extensive discussion of the usage of Hume’s contemporaries, see my “‘Scepticism’ about Induction,” 79–81 and accompanying footnotes. For discussion of contemporary usage of terms such as “reasoning,” “proof,” and “argument”—notably as revealed by Johnson’s dictionary of 1756 and confirmed by Hume’s own usage—see “‘Scepticism’ about Induction,” 75.

23 Likewise, I sought to justify my own claim against Garrett that Humean “reason” required reinterpretation in the wake of his famous argument (“Reason and Induction,” 145–47), but now find this ultimately unconvincing.

24 This form of argument suggests that Hume sees sensation as a possible foundation for judgment by reason but does not imply that sensation is strictly a part of reason, only that—in Hutcheson’s term—it “reports to” reason.

25 Garrett mentions this footnote in a different connection, arguing that within it Hume’s “use of ‘the understanding’ . . . is clearly meant to be that of scholastic philosophers, rather than Hume himself” (Hume, 91). This is very debatable, partly because Hume’s contemporaries also commonly advocated the “vulgar division” he criticizes and Thomas Reid much later still described it as “of a very general reception” (Intellectual Powers, 67–68; see Millican, “‘Scepticism’ about Induction,” 81), and partly because Hume himself, later in the same footnote, refers to “[w]hat we may in general affirm concerning these three acts of the understanding,” writing clearly in propria persona (T 1.3.7.5n20; SBN 96–97n).

26 References to Hume’s Dissertation on the Passions are cited in the text as “DP” followed by section and paragraph number.

27 Again, for discussion of and quotations from Hume’s contemporaries, see my “‘Scepticism’ about Induction,” 79–81 and accompanying footnotes. In Reason, Induction and Causation in Hume’s Philosophy, Garrett appeals to James Beattie’s usage to support his claims (7), but for reasons I explain in “‘Scepticism’ about Induction,” such an appeal cannot be given much weight and would anyway support at most Garrett’s claim with regard to “reason” and count equally against his claim with regard to “the understanding” (80 and 80n92).

28 Moreover the latter case is clear only in the second Enquiry. Garrett states that “[i]n both the Treatise and the second Enquiry . . . [Hume] does offer both productive and responsive definitions of ‘virtue’ or . . . ‘personal merit’” (Hume, 125), but the
quotations that follow are only from the *Enquiry*, and there is no textual reference to the *Treatise*. I presume that he is alluding to T 3.3.1.30 (SBN 591), though Hume here makes no mention of *definition* and, read straightforwardly, seems to be summarizing a hypothesis about what *causes* “that particular feeling or sentiment, on which moral distinctions depend.”

29 This should be borne in mind when assessing Garrett’s appeals to the text of *Treatise* 3.3.6—the final section of the *Treatise*—to support his somewhat pro-Hutchesonian interpretation, for example, *Hume* 166–67 and 281.

30 Reference to a “sense of morals” occurs in the *Treatise* at T 3.1.1.10, 3.2.1.18, and 3.3.6.3; SBN 458, 483, 619 (twice in the last of these—within the final section of the *Treatise* which was specially rewritten and sent to Hutcheson); “sense of virtue” at T 2.1.12.5, 3.1.2.3, 3.1.2.9, 3.2.1.19, 3.2.2.20, 3.2.2.25, and (again) 3.3.6.3 (SBN 326, 471, 475, 484, 496, 500, and 619); “sense of justice” at T 3.2.1.17, 3.2.2.20, and 3.2.2.21 (SBN 483, 496, 496). None of these phrases occurs at all in the second *Enquiry*.

31 For more on the interpretation of Hutcheson and further references, including to his *Synopsis of Metaphysics* which contains his most detailed faculty taxonomy, see my “‘Scepticism’ about Induction,” section 3.2. One cannot help wondering whether Hutcheson’s enthusiasm for placing the moral sense as reporting to the understanding—expressed in multiple works published or edited in 1742—might have had something to do with his perusal of an infidel manuscript (that is, *Treatise* Book 3) in 1740 and then wishing to distance himself from it.

32 Hume himself seems to have misinterpreted Hutcheson when he wrote the subsequently deleted footnote at EHU 1.4 crediting Hutcheson with the discovery that “[m]oral Perceptions, therefore, ought not to be clas’d with the Operations of the Understanding, but with the Tastes or Sentiments.” The footnote is present only in the 1748 and 1750 editions and may be found in Beauchamp’s critical edition or in the textual variants section of my own edition (“Textual Variants,” 177–78).

33 This, therefore, fundamentally a form of egoistic hedonism, although Hume tempers it with an emphasis on the mechanism of *sympathy* which leads us to give weight to other people’s pleasures and pains (albeit only by *making them our own*—so the motivation is still at least quasi-egoistic). Hume recognizes that this is not the whole story when he observes the *benevolence* we feel towards those we love (and anger towards those we hate), though I take it to be significant that when he does so, it is with a deep expression of disappointment at the consequent loss of theoretical simplicity from his system (T 2.2.6.2; SBN 366–67). This recognition is echoed later, for example, at T 2.3.3.9 and 2.3.9.8 (SBN 417–18, 439).

34 This also parallels a very strong move away from egoism, conspicuously signalled at the beginning of section 2 of the second *Enquiry* with an attack on the selfish theory (later moved into Appendix 2, “Of Self-Love”). This seems to be unmentioned in Garrett’s book, as indeed is the entire issue of egoism, though in Hume’s time, this was a key issue of moral debate.

35 This greater emphasis on calculation strengthens the analogy with causal judgements (for example, using Hume’s “Rules by which to judge of causes and effects”), but at the same time makes the overall theory less plausibly describable as involving a sense of morality or causation.
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36 Note here that humanity—a direct concern for mankind—is not the same as sympathy in the primary Treatise sense, which is a mechanism that generates personal pleasure or pain from the pleasure or pain of others. Having rejected his previous tendency towards egoism, Hume no longer believes that we typically care about others only by making their feelings our own.

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